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I. INTRODUCTION

A thoughtful student once asked an immigration judge during an
informal exchan e: "If the respondent in your court who has just been
found deportable appears to qualify for cancellation of removal but has
failed to fill out the form properly,4 what would you do?" The judge
responded matter-of-factly, "I am not his attorney. If the application is

1. The "respondent" in an immigration deportation proceeding is the "non-citizen" who is
brought by the government before an immigration judge to answer charges of deportability. Here,
the terms 'non-citizen,' 'immigrant,' and 'respondent' are used interchangeably. For a description
of the procedure and the use of terminology, see notes 3-5 infra.
2. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 to -724 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.), consolidated two separate proceedings, previously called "exclusion" and "deportation"
proceedings, into one, called a "removal" proceeding. See id. § 306. IIRIRA has made some
changes to terminology; it has maintained the term deportation, deportable, and deportability. This
article uses the term deportation as signifying the process of removal of 'noncitizens' from the
United States. The term "deportation" is chosen, not only because it is technically accurate but also
because it captures the severity of the measure more appropriately. The term removal is also used
where appropriate. The principal body of United States immigration law, the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.), uses the term "alien" to signify the noncitizen status of a person. See id. §
101(a)(3). Although this author has used the term 'alien' in his previous writings for the sake of
accuracy, because of increasing concerns about the pejorative nature of this term and in order to
minimize the possibility of confusion for purposes of this article, the term "alien" is replaced with
the term "noncitizen" throughout this article. Incidentally, it is interesting to note that among other
countries, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom have also replaced it with the term
noncitizen. See Won Kidane, The Terrorism Bar to Asylum in Australia, Canada, The United
Kingdom, and the United States: TransportingBest Practices, 33 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 300, 300
n.3 (2010).
3. Cancellation of removal is one of many forms of affirmative relief that is available for
noncitizens who have been found deportable. The requirements for cancellation of removal are set
forth under INA sections 240A (a)-(b). The grounds of deportability are set forth under INA section
237(a). The process is elaborated in subsequent sections.
4. There are two forms that could be used to apply for cancellation of removal. Both are
made available by the Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR).
One of the forms is the EOIR-42A: Application for Cancellation of Removal for Certain Permanent
Residents, available at http://wwwjustice.gov/eoir/eoirforms/eoir42a.pdf. The second one is called
the EOIR-42B: Application for Cancellation of Removal and Adjustment of Status for Certain
Nonpermanent Residents, available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/eoirforms/eoir42b.pdf. These
forms contain detailed instructions on how the applicant must complete the form. The forms are
difficult to understand for any person who has not studied immigration law. This point is further
elaborated by example below.
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not completed properly, I don't have an application to consider." 5 It
goes without saying that the judge would then order the respondent
deported for not submitting a properly completed application for relief.
The judge's response might have seemed harsh or even insensitive to the
student, but wasn't that the right answer under the existing adversarial
system? If so, what could be done to avoid such kinds of harsh
consequences? This article considers these basic questions through a
comparative lens. 6

S. This incident happened a few years ago in the presence of the author. The exchange and
the discussions thereafter provided the impetus for this article. The identities of the parties to this
exchange are withheld.
6. Several notable functions are attributed to comparative law research. Understanding one's
own system better and looking for inspirations from other systems to improve it are considered to be
perhaps the most important functions.

See RENt DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL

SYSTEMS INTHE WORLD TODAY 4, 6-7 (3d ed. 1985). The objectives of this comparative study are
primarily seeking inspiration from the civil law inquisitorial legal tradition. The greatest diversity
in law seems to be found in the epistemology of determining facts, not substantive notions of right
and wrong. Consider the following anecdote. The former President of the World Court, Queen's
Counsel (Q.C.), T.O. Elias once asked two Ugandan Customary Law judges what they would do if
A were to sue B for cheating A out of his proper share of the spoils of a joint raid on C's banana
plantation. He said that the judges looked at each other with astonishment, laughed, and almost
spontaneously responded that they would order both A and B arrested and C compensated. The
Q.C. was testing the geographic reach and relevance of some fundamental substantive rules of the
law of contracts that he had studied at the University of London and the British Inns of Courts, and
applied at the Peace Palace in The Hague. (Q.C. or K.C. (King's Counsel when there is a King) is a
title given to the very elite of the English barristers. See UGO A. MATTEl, TEEMU RUSKOLA &
ANTONIO GIDI, SCHLESINGER'S COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES-TEXT-MATERIALS 644, 646 (7th ed.
2009)). The encounter symbolically confirmed his suspicion that substantive notions of fairness
tend to converge notwithstanding profound diversity in human societies. See T. OLAWALE ELIAS,
THE NATURE OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 153 (1956).
Procedures are characterized by
remarkable diversity. Consider another of Judge Elias's related experiments. This particular
instance involved a criminal court proceeding in Nigeria during British colonial rule. The accused
appeared before a British judge who was trained in the Common Law legal tradition. The charge
was riding a bike at night without a headlight. The judge read the charges and asked the accused:
"How do you plead?" Failing to understand the question, the accused asked for clarification. The
judge then said: "Are you guilty or not guilty?" The accused grinned at the magistrate, shook his
head, and retorted somewhat acidly: "What a question! Is that not what I have been dragging
before you to find out?" Id. at 299. This Nigerian man sounds a lot like an immigrant in a
deportation proceeding in Tacoma, Washington; York, Pennsylvania; Baltimore, Maryland, or any
other location in America where deportation proceedings are regularly held. Although the term
'immigrant' has a specific meaning under the INA (defined in relation to the term non-immigrant),
it is used here to suggest the noncitizen status of the person. For the technical definition of an
immigrant, see INA section 101(a)(15).
There are currently fifty-nine immigration courts
throughout the country. The Immigration Courts are within the EOIR, itself an agency of the
Department of Justice. Comprehensive information is available on the official website of the EOIR
at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/index.html.
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Unrepresented and confused,7 the typical immigrant does not know
his role in the tripartite adversarial trial. During a master calendar
hearing,9 for example, he is likely to understand the first two questions
but nothing more. The typical questions are as follows: "You are not a
United States citizen. Do you admit or deny?" Fair enough-the
immigrant admits it.10 Second, "You are a national of country X."
Again, the immigrant easily comprehends and admits the charge. But
this is typically the limit of his comprehension. The next question may
be: "You are removable under INA 237(a)(1)(A) as an alien
inadmissible at the time of entry.'1 Do you admit or deny?" In most
likelihood, this will be incomprehensible to the immigrant. He may
request translation into his native language, but the translation of the
words alone is not helpful.12 Thoroughly confused, the immigrant

7. Although the noncitizen has the right to hire counsel, there is currently no right to
appointed counsel. See INA § 240(b)(4)(A); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.3, 1292.1 (2006); see also OrantesHernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549, 554 (9th Cir. 1990). Finding pro bono representation is
often very difficult for indigent respondents. According to EOIR 2008 data, approximately 58
percent of all respondents in deportation proceedings were not represented. See STEPHEN H.
LEGOMSKY AND CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 669 (5th

ed. 2009) (citing 85 IR 2445 (Sept. 8, 2008)). The percentage of detained noncitizens in removal
proceedings who are not represented is currently 84 percent. See ARNOLD PORTER LLP, AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM:
PROPOSAL TO PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS, EFFICIENCY, AND PROFESSIONALISM IN THE
ADJUDICATION OF REMOVAL CASES 5-8 (2010) [hereinafter ABA REPORT ON REFORMING THE
at
available
SYSTEM],
IMMIGRATION

http://new.abanet.org/Immigration/PublicDocuments/abacomplete-fullreport.pdf.
8. Immigration Court proceedings are adversarial. An immigration judge, who is an
employee of the Department of Justice, i.e., EOIR, presides over the hearing. The Government, i.e.,
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is represented by counsel who is an employee of the
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) within the DHS. As indicated above, the noncitizen,
who may be represented at his own expense, is called the respondent. For an excellent overview of
the process, see Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J.
1635, 1641-45 (2010).
9. ICE initiates removal proceedings by serving the alien a written notice called the Notice to
Appear (NTA) under INA section 239(a)(1). A Master Calendar hearing is a preliminary hearing
designed to narrow the issues for a subsequent individual hearing. The proceedings are governed by
section 240 of the INA. This section is discussed in detail in subsequent sections.
10. This assumption is fair in most cases, but it is important to note that even this could be a
problem because it is possible that the alleged noncitizen is not actually a noncitizen, despite the
belief to the contrary, as the citizenship law is complex. See, e.g., INA § 320 (addressing the
citizenship status of children born outside of the United States).
I1. The grounds of inadmissibility are set forth under INA section 212(a)(1)(A). A person
who is inadmissible at the time of entry may be removed under INA section 237(a)(1)(A) as an alien
removable as "[i]nadmissible at the time of entry." This notion is difficult to explain to the typical
immigrant in removal proceedings.
12. Approximately 78 percent of all noncitizens in deportation proceedings need interpreters.
Legomsky, supra note 8, at 1653 (citing TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE
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would typically admit this last charge as well. The judge would then
say: "On the basis of your admission, I hereby find you removable from
the United States."' 3 He would then ask: "Do you want to apply for an
affirmative relief?" 14 Again, the immigrant would typically be at a loss,
perhaps thinking the lack of comprehension might be a translation issue.
After a lengthy back and forth between the immigrant respondent and
the interpreter, an exchange which the judge typically would not
understand, the respondent finally answers "no," whereupon the judge
proceeds to order the immigrant removed,15 and moves onto the next
case. Sometimes, if it appears to a sympathetic judge that the respondent
is eligible for a form of affirmative relief, she might give the respondent
a copy of the relevant application form with instructions to complete it
and bring it back on a designated date. Because the form is very
technical and complicated, typically the immigrant would bring it back
without having answered the questions properly. Frustrated with the
perceived incompetence, the judge may give the respondent another
opportunity to fill it out, and might suggest that the respondent find an
attorney. Very often, the noncitizen would bring it back in exactly the
same shape as before or with minimal inconsequential amendments
because he could neither find a pro bono counsel nor understand the
form any better than he did before. For example, the detailed
instructions that EOIR-42A, Application for Cancellation of Removal
for Certain Permanent Residents, give include the following statement:
Prior to service of the Notice to Appear, or prior to committing a
criminal or related offense referred to in sections 212(a)(2) and
237(a)(2) of the INA, or prior to committing a security or related
offense referred to in section 237(a)(4) of the INA, you have at least
seven (7) years continuous residence in the United States after having
been lawfully admitted in any status[.]"16

(TRAC), CASE BACKLOGS IN IMMIGRATION COURTS EXPAND, RESULTING WAIT TIMES GROW,

http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/208/) (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
13. This is pursuant to INA section 240(c)(1)(A).
14. This is pursuant to INA section 240(c)(4). The types of affirmative relief include
Cancellation of Removal under INA section 240A(a)-(b); Adjustment of Status under INA section
245; Registration under INA section 249; Asylum under INA section 208, Withholding of Removal
under INA section 241 (b)(3); and relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture, Dec.
10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (incorporated into U.S. Law by the Foreign Affairs Reform and
Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-761 (codified at 8 U.S.C § 1231
Note). For a discussion of the forms of affirmative relief, see LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note
7, at 595-646.
15. This is pursuant to INA section 240(c)(1)(A).
16. See EOIR-42A, supra note 4, at I (instructions).
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Even if the respondent has access to the referenced sections of the INA,
the provisions are so technical and complex that the respondent's
attempts to decipher them would be in vain. By this time, the judge
would proceed to order the non-citizen deported, at the urging of the
government's counsel, and due to the judge's patience bein exhausted
by the noncitizen's inability to fill out this form properly!W Typically,
the government executes the order forthwith.' 8
There is currently no credible opposition to the view that
immigration adjudication in the United States is indefensibly flawed as it
Professor
lacks accuracy, consistency, efficiency, and acceptability.
Legomsky describes the manifestations of the problem as "dubious and
inconsistent outcomes; a lack of confidence in the results felt by parties,
reviewing courts, and commentators; an extraordinary surge of requests
for judicial review of the final administrative decisions; substantial
duplication of effort; and lengthy delays." 20 Informed by several
credible studies, Legomsky assessed the available evidence under four
basic criteria: accuracy, efficiency, acceptability, and consistency.21 He
considers the system to have failed its purpose under all four criteria.22
As of April 30, 2009, approximately 201,000 cases were pending for an
average of 14.5 months before the nation's approximate ranks of 214
immigration judges.23 Each immigration law judge completes an
estimated 4.3 cases per day.24 The inconsistencies are stark-they range

17. ICE attorneys invariably view their role as the adversary of the noncitizen. See, e.g., ABA
REPORT ON REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 1-60 (recommending that

DHS should "clarify that the mission of the DHS attorney is to promote justice rather than to defeat
the immigrants' claims in every case.").
18. This account is based on the author's own observation of these proceedings for over seven
years as a clinical professor supervising law students appearing as representatives in these
proceedings. The judge is required to advise the noncitizen that he would have the right to appeal
under INA section 505(c)(l)-(2). For the unrepresented noncitizen, this would be of no
consequence.
19. See Legomsky, supra note 8, at 1645.
20. Id. at 1645. The average immigration judge completes an average of 4.3 cases a day. Id.
at 1652.
21. Id. at 1645-51.
22. Id. at 1651. Professor Legomsky is not alone in his critical result. Several others consider
the system to be a failure, including, most notably, the ABA's Commission on Immigration. See
generally ABA REPORT ON REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 7.

23. See Legomsky, supra note 8, at 1648. This number has fluctuated over time and it also
appears that different reports tend to give slightly different figures. For a tabular presentation of the
available data and a good analysis of it, see generally Lenni B. Benson, You Can'tget Therefrom
Here: ManagingJudicialReview of Immigration Cases, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 405 (2007).
24. See Legomsky, supra note 8, at 1652.
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from 5 to 88 percent approval rate within the same court system.25
Represented asylum-seekers are almost three times more likely to
prevail than unrepresented ones.26 About 84 percent of detained
noncitizens in removal proceedings are unrepresented.27 Each of the
fifteen members of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decides an
average of about 2,500 cases annually or more than 50 cases per week. 28
The courts of appeals receive about 10,280 petitions for review, or about
17 percent of the combined caseload of all circuit courts of appeals,
which is said to be at a crisis level for these courts.29 They remand a
significant proportion of these appeals because of inaccuracies and
inconsistencies. o Based on these glaring findings, Professor Legomsky
concludes that "the current immigration adjudication system is
fundamentally flawed." 3 1
25. See id. at 1650 n.71. Several studies have shown these disparities, particularly in asylum
adjudications. See, e.g., Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee
Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REv. 295, 296 (2007) ("Colombian
asylum applicants whose cases were adjudicated in the federal immigration court in Miami had a
5% chance of prevailing with one of that court's judges and an 88% chance of prevailing before
another judge in the same building. Half of the Miami judges deviated by more than 50% from the
court's mean grant rate for Colombian cases.").
26. See Ramji-Nogales et al., supranote 25, at 340.
27. See ABA REPORT ON REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 5-8.

28. See Legomsky, supra note 8, at 1654.
29. Id. at 1646-47. In 2008, 41 percent of all cases pending before the 2nd Circuit Court of
Appeals constituted immigration cases. The corresponding figure for the 9th Circuit was 34
percent.
30. Id. at 1647. While the 2nd Circuit remanded 20 percent of the immigration cases, the 7th
Circuit remanded 40 percent of all immigration cases. Id. A good demonstration of the frustration
of the courts of appeals with immigration adjudication is Circuit Judge Posner's statement in
Benslimane v. Gonzales:
This tension between judicial and administrative adjudicators is not due to judicial
hostility to the nation's immigration policies or to a misconception of the proper standard
of judicial review of administrative decisions. It is due to the fact that the adjudication
of these cases at the administrative level has fallen below the minimum standards of
legal justice.
430 F.3d 828, 829-30 (7th Cir. 2005).
31. See Legomsky, supra note 8, at 1651. This problem of inefficiency and costliness is not
unique to immigration. It is a part of a more systemic problem across many areas. Consider for
example, Chief Justice Warren Burger's statement about the civil justice system: "Our system is
too costly, too painful, too destructive, too inefficient for a truly civilized people." Ernst C. Stiefel
& James R. Maxeiner, Civil Justice Reform in the United States-Opportunityfor Learning from
'Civilized' European Procedure Instead of Continued Isolation? 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 147, 148
(1994) (quoting Address (Feb. 13, 1984)). For a good discussion of the perceived deficiencies of
the adversarial civil litigation and comparative assessment, see generally, Amalia D. Kessler, Our
Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure,Due Process, and the Searchfor an Alternative to the
Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1188-91 (2005); John H. Langbein, The German
Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 824 (1985), and responses to this article,
including Ronald J. Allen, Stefan Kbck, Kurt Riecherberg & D. Toby Rosen, The German
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In recent years, there has been serious recognition of these soberin
facts, which has prompted a remarkable increase in reform proposals.
Perhaps the two most notable and comprehensive proposals are the
proposal by the ABA Commission on Immigration, "Reforming the
Immigration System," and Professor Legomsky's "Restructuring
Immigration Adjudication." These two works, like most others, focus
on the macro-level issues, and seek solutions within the confines of the
United States' adversarial legal tradition. Drawing on these works, this
article focuses on the micro-level issues and draws some inspiration
from the inquisitorial civil law techniques to suggest solutions that may
improve the accuracy, efficiency, fairness, and acceptability of
deportation procedures.
Because judicial procedures often reflect society's fundamental
values and sensitivities, 33 this article does not recommend the
transplantation of the entire inquisitorial system. However, this article
argues that there is no principled reason why the basic tenets of the
inquisitorial system cannot be adopted to improve the existing system of
deportation proceedings. As stated by Professors Glendon, Carozza, and
Picker, "[t]he stimulus for comparative investigation is often a problem
that one's home system does not handle very well."34 They are,
however, careful to add that "when comparatists devote their attention to
a vexing or unsolved problem, it is not with the idea that they will find
in some foreign land a solution" but they seek the deepening of the

Advantage in Civil Procedure: A Pleafor More Details and Fewer Generalitiesin Comparative
Scholarship, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 705, 708-10, 12 (1988), and Samuel G. Gross, The American
Advantage: The Value of Inefficient Litigation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 734,734 (1987).
32. One of the most highly developed proposals is Professor Legomsky's Restructuring
Immigration Adjudication, supra note 8. This article draws extensively from Legomsky's article,
although it focuses on the micro-level issues of adjudication rather than the macro-level issues of
decisional independence and structure. This article also draws from the ABA REPORT ON
REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM. The Report, prepared by Arnold and Porter for the ABA's
Commission on Immigration, is more than 200 pages long. The full report is available on the ABA
Website at http://new.abanet.org/Immigration/PublicDocuments/aba complete full report.pdf. The
at
available
is
long,
78
pages
is
which
summary,
executive
http://new.abanet.org/Immigration/PublicDocuments/ReformingthelmmigrationSystemExecutiveSu
mmary.pdf. Other recent proposals include: Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 25 (proposing the
conversion of the BIA into an Article I court); Benson, supra note 23 (urging a more careful
examination of the ailments of the existing system of judicial review of immigration decisions
before attempting to craft reforms).
33. See Kevin M. Clermont, Why Comparative Civil Procedure?, Preface to KuO-CHANG
HUANG, INTRODUCING DISCOVERY INTO CIVIL LAW, at ix, xi-xix (2003), reprintedin THOMAS 0.
MAIN, GLOBAL ISSUES IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 5 (2006).
34. MARY ANN GLENDON, PAOLO G. CAROZZA & COLIN B. PICKER, COMPARATIVE LEGAL
TRADITIONS 7 (3d ed. 2007).
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understanding of the problem within their own system.35 They continue
stating that "our own way of doing things seems so natural to us that
often it is only comparison with another way that establishes that there is
something to be explained." 36 More importantly, as Professor Glendon
suggests, comparative analysis may be necessary to "disrupt our settled
understandings, leading us to new judgments and prompting new
decisions, commitments and actions."3
Judge Walter Schaefer once noted, "The American system puts a
premium on skill, adroitness, [and] even trickery, on both sides." 38
Nowhere is this approach as evident as in deportation proceedings,
where the combatants are the government's 'gladiator-attorneys' who
are "not primarily crusading after the truth, but seeking to win" on the
one hand, and the unrepresented noncitizen on the other hand. The
process is moderated by a judge who the system deliberately keeps
"ignorant and unprepared" so that she might neutrally observe the battle
and declare the winner.40
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. MARY ANN GLENDON, STORY AND LANGUAGE IN AMERICA (lecture by), in GLENDON ET
AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS, supra note 33, at 23.

38. Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031,
1048 n.44 (1975) (quoting Judge Walter V. Schaefer, Remarks). Even Chief Justice Warren Burger
praises the skillful lawyer who "tactfully destroys" his opponent in the court room. See Warren E.
Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certificationof Advocates
Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 227, 236 (1973). He describes some
skillful litigators as:
[I]ntensely individualistic, but each was a lawyer for whom courtroom manners were a
key weapon in his arsenal. Whether engaged in the destruction of adverse witnesses or
undermining damaging evidence or final argument, the performance was characterized
by coolness, poise and graphic clarity, without shouting or ranting, and without baiting
witnesses, opponents or the judge. We cannot all be great advocates, but as every lawyer
seeks to emulate tactics, he can approach, if not achieve, superior skill as an advocate.
Id.
39.

This term is used by Judge Marvin E. Frankel. See Frankel, supra note 38, at 1039 ("The

litigator's devices, let be clear, have utility in testing dishonest witnesses, ferreting out falsehoods,
and thus exposing the truth. But to a considerable degree these devices are like other potent
weapons, equally, lethal for heroes and villains. It is worth stressing, therefore, that the gladiator
using the weapons in the courtroom is not primarily crusading after the truth, but seeking to win. If
this is banal, it is also overlooked too much. . . .").
40. The terms 'ignorant' and 'unprepared' are used by Judge Frankel. See id at 1042. The
whole passage, which is very instructive, reads:
The ignorance and unpreparedness of the judge are intended axioms of the system. The
"facts" are to be found and asserted by the contestants. The judge is not to have
investigated or explored the evidence before trial. No one is to have done it for him.
The judicial counterpart in civil law countries, with the file of the investigating
magistrate before him, is a deeply "alien" conception . . . Without an investigative file,
the American trial judge is a blind and blundering intruder, acting in spasms as sudden
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An observer familiar with the adjudicatory processes in both the
adversarial (accusatorial) common law legal tradition and the
investigative (inquisitorial) civil law legal tradition41 puzzles over this
process and the immigration judge's answer to the student's question
mentioned above. Thus, the most fundamental question that this article
raises would be: Is there any justifiable reason why deportation
proceedings should be adversarial when in the great majority of cases
the only two lawyers in the courtroom are the government's counsel and
the judge? It answers the question in the negative and argues that
deportation proceedings combine the worst aspects of the adversarial
and inquisitorial legal traditions because of two primary reasons: (1) the
judge is neither completely passive-reflective nor neutral as she is
statutorily required to probe credibility through cross examination; (2)
She is prohibited from assuming an investigative role because her
mandate is limited to the adjudication of cases on the record i.e., on the
basis of party submission alone.42 The article further argues that the
system's use of about 950 government attorneys 43 as the noncitizens'

flashes of seeming light may lead to mislead him at odd times.
Id. Although this generally holds true in deportation proceedings, there are some peculiarities,
which will be elaborated further in Part II infra. This 'battle' is also sometimes described as a
"duel."

See JOHN BELL, SOPHIE BOYRON & SIMON WHITTAKER, PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH LAW 86

(2d ed. 2008).
41. On the use of terminology, Professor Glenn writes that in the civil law legal tradition, the
legal process is really not called anything, but that common law lawyers often call it, somewhat
pejoratively, "inquisitorial." He suggests that it could properly be called "investigative." He also
notes that civil law lawyers correspondingly call the common law's adversarial system
"accusatorial." See H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 144 & n.47 (4th ed.
2010). Despite this suggestion, however, for ease of reference and simplicity, this article uses the
terms inquisitorial and investigative, and adversarial and accusatorial interchangeably where
appropriate. One of the important notes that Professor Glenn offers is the notion that in the
inquisitorial system, the law is written. "Since it exists it must be enforced, and judges have to
actively establish the facts which justify its application." Id. at 144. This notion will be elaborated
throughout this article.
42. Another related reason why the existing system is the worst of two worlds is that fact that
it is not considered adversarial in the legal sense while there is no doubt that it is effectively
adversarial. In Ardestani v. INS, the Supreme Court held that for purposes of recovery of attorney's
fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) deportation proceedings are not
considered adversarial. The effect of that ruling is the unlike in other proceedings where a winning
party may recover attorney's fees and other expenses from the government if the government had
taken a position that is not "substantially justified." See Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 132-33,
138-39 (1991), discussed in LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 7, at 683. For a detailed
presentation of the argument that the existing system is in fact the worst of two worlds, see infra
Part III.
43. There are currently 712 ICE attorneys who represent the DHS in removal proceedings.
The Office of Immigration Litigation (OIL) within the DOJ also has 239 attorneys. Currently the
total number is 951. See Legomsky, supra note 8, at 1701.
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adversaries in deportation cases not only adds significant cost and
It then
inefficiency but also compromises accuracy in proceedings.
asks what would happen if these many government attorneys are
converted into administrative law judges with inquisitorial functions. 45
Wouldn't we save a significant amount of money, increase efficiency,
and provide a more accurate result?4 6 The article answers this question
in the affirmative and offers the reasons.47
With this background, the article is divided into five sections. To
help answer the question why different systems adopt different
procedural methods for the resolution of legal controversies and why we
have the system that we do, the second section traces the origins and
development of the common law and civil law legal traditions and
outlines the differences in their techniques of adjudication. It also
provides a comparative analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of
each system, focusing on the roles and responsibilities of judges and
party litigants in civil, criminal, and administrative contexts.
The assignment of adjudicative functions to administrative
agencies, which was a function of the rise of the administrative state, has
not produced a uniform model. While some agencies, like the Social
Security Administration, follow what appears to be the inquisitorial
model, others, such as the immigration system, follow what is decidedly
adversarial model. The third section discusses the default importation of
the adversarial system into immigration proceedings and critically
examines the effects of the adversarial system and outlines its
shortcomings. The fourth section provides a brief but detailed summary
Bringing the
of the existing diagnostics and reform proposals.
discussions in the previous four sections to bear, the fifth section
outlines the advantages that the inquisitorial system may have in the
deportation context and shows how the replacement of the adversarial
system with the inquisitorial system could improve the existing system
of adjudication by significantly increasing efficiency, reducing cost, and
improving accuracy and acceptability. The sixth section offers a
summary of conclusions.
44. For a detailed discussion of this proposition, see infra Part IV.
45. Issues of importation of prosecutorial bias could be recognized and addressed. For a
fuller discussion, see Section IV infra.
46. Bearing the cost of appointed counsel is the most obvious measure that could even the
playing field. Although that will be a very welcome development if it happens, which will not be
anytime soon, this article argues that even then, the system would face the same kinds of problems
that the public defenders system is facing in terms of effectiveness of representation and that the
inquisitorial model could be more efficient and fair.
47. For a detailed discussion of this proposition, see infra Part IV.
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II. THE DIVERSITY OF ADJUDICATORY SYSTEMS: ADVERSARIAL AND
INQUISITORIAL JUSTICE

The divergence between the common law and civil law legal
traditions is not limited to the procedures of adjudication.48 However,
this section focuses on the diversity of approaches and techniques of
adjudication in these systems. Neither system is uniform across
different geographic areas. Recognizing the considerable diversity
within each system, this section focuses on the most common features of
each system for purposes of comparison.49 To provide context, it begins
with a brief description of the genesis of each system.
A.

AdversarialJustice

The origins of the English common law are often traced to the 1066
Rooted in the centralized
Norman Conquest of England.50
administration of William, Conqueror at Hastings, English common law
"grew in rugged exclusiveness, disdaining fellowship with the more
polished learning of the civilians." 5 1
The common law, which is essentially a system of writs, 52 is
characterized as "a law of procedure; whatever substantive law existed
was hidden by it, 'secreted in its interstices'." 53 Traditionally, to bring a
legal action, the plaintiff had to identify the right writ and bring it before
a jury which "enjoyed a monopoly on . . . substantive decision
making." 54 When there was no applicable writ available, there was no
action or remedy. 55 Because the actual decision making on the facts and
the applicable law was left to the jury, the judge's responsibility was

48. Other divergences are related to the theory and sources of law, constitutional and judicial
structure, basic assumptions, and values. See MATTEI, supra note 6, at 25.
49. "It cannot be doubted that such typical features exist and distinguish civil law procedure
from common law (especially American) procedure." MATTEI, supra note 6, at 707.
50. See GLENDON ET AL., supranote 34, at 153.
51. Id. at 153-54 (quoting [VOL] FREDERICK POLLOCK AND FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND,
THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I (2d ed. 1898, reissued in 1968)).
For the history of this development, see id. at 153-69.
52. A writ is basically an instruction from the Crown to an officer, usually the sheriff, to
investigate a legal dispute. See GLENN, supra note 41, at 243. According to Professor Glenn, by
the middle of the thirteenth century, there were about 50 writs and that number grew by only 25 in
the six centuries that followed. Id.
53. See id.
54. Id.
55. Id. This notion is usually stated as "where there is no writ there is no right." GLENDON
ET AL., supra note 34, at 158.
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essentially jurisdictional, i.e., to determine whether the said action fit the
chosen writ.5 6
As Professor Glenn neatly describes, the jury was originally
supposed to know everything about the case, including the facts and the
law, which was essentially a local matter.5 7 Thus, the duty of the
parties' advocates was essentially to argue whether the outcome they
sought from the jury was authorized and required by the applicable
writ.5 8 As the judicial system evolved, even to the point "when
witnesses eventually came to be necessary, the lawyer continued to
plead to issue, and now brought forth the facts they needed" to prevail
under the writ.5 9
The judge had no responsibility of finding 'objective' facts; nor did the
lawyers. There was no external law stating with precision the facts to
which it applied. Since the members of the jury had day jobs, and
were usually illiterate, the argument and proof had to be made orally,
in what came to be known as a trial (as in the old trial by ordeal ...
60

In particular, Glenn goes on describing the judge's role in these
terms:
The trial is a dramatic event in which the judge plays a commanding,
but distant, role, as befitting a source of law. Freed from the burden of
finding fact, advised on law and fact by the barristers . . . the judge
could concentrate on the general contours of the writs [and] the general
contours of the law. Judicial rulings by a very small number of royal
judges working out of Westminster on circuit eventually came to
.
define the ambit of the writs . ...

Writs gradually developed into substantive common law,62 but they
originally "reflected, above all, an agrarian, non-commercial, even

56. See GLENN, supra note 41, at 243.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 243-44.
61. Id. at 244 (footnotes omitted). "The writs were fundamental, however, since they
determined when you could get to the jury, and they became the best available indicators of a
secreted, substantive, common law." Id.
62. Id. The most common writs included: writ of ejectment, the writs of debts and covenants,
writs for trespass, assault or battery, etc. Id. at 245. The historical context that necessitated the
development of the common law is interesting. According to Glenn, "[t]he Normans incorporated
the local jury into the working of their new, modem, royal courts" because they did not want to
appear to be imposing their own laws on the locals, who were defeated militarily but had to be
governed by law. Glenn further asks, "How could you get rid of all the local, informal traditions,
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chthonic society."63 Being deeply indigenous and complex, the common
law enjoyed an appreciable degree of 'impermeability' or even
'immunity' from outside influence, particularly the civil law.64
Although it has under one fundamental changes over the centuries, it is
still "the same ship." 6
The most common Norman method of resolving disputes was a
"trial by battle," which determined who the "better man" was, or who
Trial by ordeal was another common
deserved the legal victory.
method.67 Even after the jury was put to use for purposes of the
administration of justice, it was in the context of bringing more
witnesses to attest in favor of one or the other party.68 At some point,
one who could produce twelve jurors to testify on his behalf was
considered a winner. Thus, the aim of both parties was to produce more
jurors than his adversary. 69
It was during the reign of King Henry II that the jury system was
devised as a tool for the administration of justice.70 The use by circuit
courts of juries made perfect sense as the judges were outsiders and the
The jury was eventually
jurors were informed commoners. 7 1
transformed from a body of informant men to a body of men that would
hear information from others and make a decision based on that
information. 72

nesting here and there in the countryside? And with what?" He goes on to answer his own
questions: "The process of insinuating a common law into a vigorous, and not very friendly,
society, was a major undertaking, to be pursued on many fronts." Id. at 247.
63. Id. at 245.
64. Id. Professor Glenn suggests that the claim of immunity is perhaps exaggerated as there
have been notable influences and counter-influences of the systems. Id.
65. See id. at 253-69. The jury is at the center of the adversarial trial. The jury has been
described by Pope Innocent III as "a peculiarly English institution." See LoRD DEVLIN, TRIAL BY
JURY 4 (1966), excerpted in GLENDON, supra note 34, at 520-21. Its origin is very interesting;
historically, it had nothing to do with the administration of justice. The Normans brought the
concept with them to England as a means of collecting information from the local people. Id at
520-22. A juror was a man who would take an oath and provide information to the King for
administrative purposes. He had to be a member of the community and had to possess some
knowledge about the day to day life of the people. If the King was needed to rule on an issue, he
would typically rely on the sworn statement of jurors. The jury only came to be associated with the
administration ofjustice as a later development. Id
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. Historically, all civil cases in England were tried by jury until the year 1854, at which
point the use of the jury began to decline. See Ward v. James, [1966] Q.B. 273
[Eng.]. in GLENDO
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The adversarial trial is divided into the pretrial phase and the trial
phase, where discovered evidence is presented, was in part necessitated
by the need to accommodate the schedules of twelve jurors, the
disputing parties, and the judge.73 This division has continued to be the
hallmark of the common law legal tradition, including in the United
Sates. 4 In other words, the drama of adversarial advocacy, originally
designed to educate, persuade, and influence illiterate jurors, has
continued to dominate modem adversarial trials, even when a jury is not
involved. 76
Although the system of an adversarial trial, as Chief Justice Burger
said, is "a child of the common law, the [American] legal profession has
For example,
developed in ways that do not parallel England's."
England has long abandoned the use of the jury in most civil cases,
Pretrial discovery is now
though America still maintains the option.
uniquely American,79 and the training, licensure, and discipline of
American lawyers are also significantly different than those of their
English counterparts. 8 0
As far as criminal justice is concerned, in England before the 16th
century, a person accused of a criminal offense did not have the right to
representation if accused of a felony, had no access to the government's
evidence, and did not have the right to present his own evidence.81

ET AL., supra note 34, at 525. In 1933 the British Parliament enacted the Administration of Justice

Act, limiting the use of civil jury to limited actions as a matter of right and giving the judge the
discretion whether to involve a jury in all other cases. The excepted cases were fraud, libel, slander,
malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, seduction, or breach of promise to marriage. Id. The
result was dramatic-the Act effectively killed the civil jury in England. Id at 532. By the time
Ward v. James was decided in 1966, only 2 percent of civil cases were tried by jury. Ward
considered issues relating to the exercise of discretion by the judge to involve or not to involve the
jury. See generally id at 524-30. Ward is considered the principal case that effectively marked the
end of the civil jury system in England. See id. at 532.
73. See MATTEl ET AL., supra note 6, at 761.
74. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery and the Role of the Judge in Civil Law
Jurisdictions,73 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1017, 1020 (1998).
75. See GLENN, supra note 41, at 244.
76. See Hazard, supra note 74, at 10 19-20.
77. See Burger, supra note 38, at 227. According to the Chief Justice, the "turbulent
diversity" makes "it impossible to transplant the English system. . . ." See id. The basic features of
the adversarial model remain similar.
78. See id. at 228.
79. See Hazard, supra note 74, at 1018.
80. See Burger, supra note 38, at 227-30. This citation does not endorse the Chief Justice's
suggestion that English barristers are better trained, better disciplined, and generally better equipped
than American lawyers who receive the training differently; the citation is for the difference in the
training.
81. See GLENDON ETAL.,supra note 34, at 251-52.
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Moreover, he would remain detained throughout the entire trial
Although the rights of the accused have improved
process.82
dramatically since then, particularly since the mid-19th century, "the
process nevertheless retains elements of the earlier trial-that notion that
it is a form of combat." 83
Be that as it may, "[Aill the common law systems begin with a
concept of the adversary system, which defines the roles of the judge
and the parties' advocates."4 While the role of the judge remains that of
judging between competing presentations of evidence, facts and law, the
role of the party litigants is to provide such presentation.85
The judge is not responsible for there being an adequate development
of the evidence during trial and a fortiori is not responsible for there
being adequate pretrial discovery of evidence. Nor is the judge
responsible for getting at "the truth." The judge simply chooses
between the contentions of law and the versions of facts laid before
him by the parties.8 6
The objective of all systems of adjudication is presumably to find
out the truth and arrive at a just result. Different systems attempt to
accomplish this objective through different means. As a prelude for the
comparative analysis that follows, consider the adversarial posture in our
system. The lawyers on each side are supposed to be active, responsive,
imaginative, and partisan advocates, while the judge is required to be
Asked if zealous advocacy by
passive, reflective, and neutral.
President Nixon's counsels would "involve [the] country in confusion,"
Dean Monroe Freedman, a renowned legal scholar in the field of legal
ethics, said that the adversarial system envisions the same kind of
advocacy on both sides.89 As support for his argument, he quoted Lord
Brougham's statement given in 1812 in the Trial of Queen Caroline:
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all
the world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all

82. See id.
83. Id.
84. See Hazard, supra note 74, at 1019 (footnotes omitted).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. This notion and the controversies surrounding it are elaborated further at the end of this
section.
88. See Frankel, supra note 38, at 1033 (citing DAVID W. PECK, THE COMPLEMENT OF COURT
AND COUNSEL 9 (1954) (13th Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture)).
89. See id. at 1036 & n.14 (citing Freedman, The President'sAdvocate and the Public Trust,
N.Y.U. L.J., Mar. 27, 1974, at 1, Col. I and 2.)
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means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons,
and, among them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in
performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the
destruction which he may bring upon others. Separating the duty of a
patriot from that of an advocate, he must go on reckless of
consequences, though it should be his unhappy fate to involve his
country in confusion.90
Almost amused by these statements, Human Rights First Founder,
former Columbia Law Professor, and ioneer of the Federal Sentencing
surmised that "[n]either the
guidelines, Judge Marvin Frankel,
sentiment nor even the words sound archaic after a century and half."92
Perhaps no writing has so effectively captured the shortcomings of
the adversarial system as Judge Frankel's University of Pennsylvania
Law Review article. Displaying his renowned, unique, and beautiful
writing, Judge Frankel's message is best presented by generous resort to
his own words. In response to Dean Freedman's statement about
Nixon's attorneys' above, he noted that
[t]his is a topic on which our profession has practiced some selfdeception. We proclaim to each other and to the world that the clash
of adversaries is a powerful means for hammering out the truth.
Sometimes, less uardedly, we say it is 'best calculated to getting out
all the facts . . . .'

Having acknowledged that the adversarial technique might be useful in
ironing out the truth within certain limits, he goes on to state that
[d]espite our untested statements of self-congratulation, we know that
others searching after facts-in history, geography, medicine,
whatever-do not emulate our adversary system. We know that most
countries of the world seek justice by different routes. We know that
many of the rules and devices of adversary litigation as we conduct it
are not geared for, but are often aptly suited to defeat, the development
of the truth. We are unlikely ever to know how effectively the
adversary technique would work toward truth if that were the objective
of the contestants.9 4

90. The story and the quotation are provided in Frankel, supra note 38, at 1036 (citing 2
TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 8 (J. Nightingale ed., 1821)).

91. It is believed that the Sentencing Guidelines substantially deviated from his original
proposals.
92. See Frankel,supra note 38, at 1036.
93. Id. at 1036-37 (quoting PECK, supranote 88, at 9).
94. Id.
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The respective role of the contestants is what concerns him the most.
"Employed by interested parties, the process often achieves truth only as
a convenience, a byproduct, or an accidental approximation. The
business of the advocate, simply stated, is to win if possible without
violating the law." 95 Judge Frankel summarizes his above analysis with
a remarkable conclusion: "[The role of the attorney] is not the search for
truth as such. To put that thought more exactly, the truth and victory are
mutually incompatiblefor some considerablepercentageof the attorneys
trying cases at any given time."96
Judge Frankel goes on to describe the reason why the system
incentivizes victory at the expanse of the truth or just result. "The
devices are too familiar to warrant more than a fleeting reminder. To
begin with, we leave most of the investigatory work to paid partisans,
which is scarcely a guarantee of thorough and detached exploration. Our
courts wait passively for what the parties will present, almost never
knowing-often not suspecting-what the parties have chosen not to
present."97 There is also the problem of the rules of professional
responsibility.
The ethical standards governing counsel command loyalty and zeal for
the client, but no positive obligation at all to the truth. Counsel must
not knowingly break the law or commit or countenance fraud. Within
these unconfining limits, advocates freely employ time-honored tricks
and stratagems to block or distort the truth. The litigator's devices
have utility in testing dishonest witnesses, ferreting out falsehoods, and
thus exposing the truth."98
But again,
to a considerable degree these devices are like other potent weapons,
equally lethal for heroes and villains. It is worth stressing, therefore,
that the gladiator using the weapons in the courtroom is not primarily
crusading after truth, but seeking to win. If this is banal, it is also
99
overlooked too much ... .
If the parties' attorneys are warring gladiators, what are the rules of

engagement? Circuit Judge Jerome Frank answers this question in his

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 1037.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 1038.
Id.
Id. at 1039 (emphasis added).
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very successful book, "Courts on Trial," 0 0 which devotes some focus to
lessons that trial lawyers learn on how to handle witnesses. Permeating
this topic is the repeated fact that the attorney's quest is not for the truth,
but for success. First, lawyers choose witnesses very carefully not
entirely based on what they know and what they can say, but based on
how they will do, or what they will say and how convincingly they will
say it, in court. 10 1 Second, if a witness appears to have deficiencies in
their story telling, the lawyer works closely with them to make sure that
they overcome those deficiencies and present the best demeanor before
the court. Third, the lawyer will do the exact opposite to the opposing
witnesses; they will try every trick known to man to annoy and discredit
an otherwise credible witness.102 One lesson for lawyers advises them
to try to discredit an honest and credible witness "by making him appear
more hostile than he really is. You may make him exaggerate or unsay
something and say it again." 10 3 Another lesson reads:
An intimidating manner in putting questions may so coerce or
disconcert the witness that his answers do not represent his actual
knowledge on the subject. So also, questions which in form or subject
cause embarrassment, shame or anger in the witness may unfairly lead
him to such demeanor or utterances that the impression produced by
104
his statements does not do justice to its real testimonial value.

100.

JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 82-86

(1973).
101. Id. at 80.
102. Id. at 82-86.
103. Id. at 82.
104. Id. at 82-83. Judge Frank quotes Anthony Trollope's dramatic commentary on the nature
of this form of adversarial advocacy. The quote is reproduced below, as it is very instructive:
One would naturally imagine that an undisturbed thread of clear evidence would be best
obtained from a man whose position was made easy and whose mind was not harassed;
but this is not the fact; to turn a witness to good account he must be badgered this way
and that till he nearly mad; he must be made a laughing-stock for the court; his very truth
must be turned into falsehoods, so that he may be falsely shamed; he must be accused of
all manners of villainy, threatened with all manners of punishment; he must be made to
feel that he has no friend near him, the world is all against him; he must be confounded
till he forget his right hand from his left, till his mind be turned into chaos, and his heart
into water; and then let him give evidence. What will fall from his lips when in wretch
collapse must be of special value, for the best talents of practiced forensic heroes are
daily used to bring it about; and no member of the Human Society interferes to protect
the wretch. Some sorts of torture are as it were tacitly allowed even among humane
people. Eels are skinned alive, and witnesses are scarified, and no one's blood curdles at
the sight, no soft hear is sickened at the cruelty.
Id. At the end of this quote, Professor Frank notes that, because of this kind of terror of crossexamination, the retention of a counsel who know how to do this well could even force a settlement.
Id.
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These and so many other trial and cross-examination techniques are
purposefully designed to mislead the trial judge or jury. Judge Frank
concludes:
In short, the lawyer aims at victory, at winning in the fight, not at
aiding the court to discover the facts. He does not want the trial court
to reach a sound educated guess, if it is likely to be contrary to his
client's interest. Our present trial method is thus the equivalent of
throwing peper in the eyes of a surgeon when he is performing an
operation.

If litigators, described as fighters by Judge Frank and as gladiators
who only care about winning and not crusading after the truth by Judge
Frankel, are to engage entirely in devious and cunning advocacy, how
may the only other party in the courtroom, i.e., the judge, make sure that
the truth is revealed and justice is done? Again, Judge Frankel's
analysis of the judge's role in the adversarial system is extremely
instructive:
The fact is that our system does not allow much room for effective or
just intervention by the trial judge in the adversary fight about the
facts. The judge views the case from a peak of Olympian ignorance.
His intrusions will in too many cases result from partial or skewed
insights. He may expose the secrets one side chooses to keep while
never becoming aware of the other's. He runs a good chance of
pursuing inspirations that better informed counsel have considered,
explored, and abandoned after fuller study.106
It is interesting to note that, in this kind of system, the judge's
interventions could even have negative repercussions. This is so,
according to Judge Frankel, because
[h]e risks at a minimum the supplying of more confusion than
guidance by his sporadic intrusions.
The ignorance and
unpreparedness of the judge are intended axioms of the system. The
'facts' are to be found and asserted by the contestants. The judge is
not to have investigated or explored the evidence before trial. No one
105. Id. at 85 (emphasis added). Even those who consider the adversarial system to have more
merits than demerits in helping the system arrive at a just result highlight the harmfulness of the
usual advice to witnesses and their treatment in court. See generally, Stephen McG. Bundy & Einer
Richard Elhauge, Do Lawyers Improve the Adversarial System? A General Theory of Litigation
Advice and Its Regulation, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 313 (1991) (testing different theories on the subject
and generally that lawyer advice to clients helps the court to arrive at the right decision, but
recognizes the fact that advise to testifying witnesses generally have negative impact on the finding
of the truth).
106. See Frankel, supranote 38, at 1042.
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is to have done it for him . . . The judicial counterpart in civil law

countries, with the file of the investigating magistrate before him, is a
deeply "alien" conception . . . Without an investigative file, the

American trial judge is a blind and blundering intruder, acting in
spasms as sudden flashes of seeming light may lead or mislead him at
odd times. The ignorant and unprepared jude is the properly bland
figurehead in the adversary scheme of things.
Judge Frankel then concludes:
In a system that so values winning and deplores losing, where lawyers
are trained to fight for, not to judge, their clients, where we learn as
advocates not to 'know' inconvenient things, moral elegance is not to
be expected.
The morals of the arena and the morals of the
marketplace ... tendpowerfully to shape our conduct.10 8

Of course, at the center of this discussion is a more fundamental
doctrinal dilemma as to the role of the judiciary in a republic. A story
recounted by Judge Charles Wyzanski about an interesting encounter
between Judge Learned Hand and Mr. Justice Holmes neatly
summarizes the basic doctrinal problem. According to Judge Wyzanski,
when Learned Hand was still a district court judge, he went to
Washington, D.C. to visit Justice Holmes.109 Among the cases that
Justice Holmes was to review were supposedly several cases decided at
the trial level by Judge Hand.110 At the end of the visit, Justice Holmes
gave Judfe Hand a ride on his carriage on his way to the Supreme Court
building.
As Judge Hand stepped out of the carriage, he waved
goodbye to Justice Holmes and said: "Do justice, Sir." In response,

107. Id. He goes on describing the unbalanced system:
[B]ecause the parties and counsel control the gathering and presentation of evidence, we
have made no fixed, routine, expected place for the judge's contributions . .. As a result,
[the trial judge's] interruptions are just that-interruptions: occasional, unexpected,
sporadic, unprogrammed, and unduly dramatic because they are dissonant and out of
character.
Id.
108. Id. at 1051 (emphasis added). This passive role of the judge in the adversarial system has
been expressed in many other ways. For example, Mr. Justice Holmes has been quoted as saying:
[Tihe judge's function [is] interstitial; molecular, not molar. Or to put it more dramatic
terms, the judge was like the Greek chorus in Greek tragedy, not a principal actor but an
interpreter of the actors. His grace was the grace of forbearance and sympathetic
understanding; not his share the action and passion of his time except in after dinner
speeches.
See Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., Equal Justice Through Law, 47 TUL. L. REV. 951, 954-55 (1973).
109. Id. at 955.
110. Id.
Ill . Id.
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"Holmes beckoned to him and said, 'Sonny, come back here. You don't
understand my job. It is to apply the law."'1 1 2 This anecdote is an
excellent demonstration of the conflicting schools of thought on the role
of the judiciary, commonly known as the conflict between interpretive
judges and activist judges. 13 This fundamental debate manifests itself
at the micro level in the courtrooms, and in the attitudes demonstrated by
the immigration judge's response mentioned at the beginning of the
introduction and by Justice Holmes in responding to Judge Hand's
seemingly idealistic farewell.
B.

InquisitorialJustice

How does the inquisitorial system address some of the same
problems differently? A brief historical survey provides context. The
literature classifies the origin of the civil law into two families:
Romanic and Germanic.11 4 Owing to centuries of interaction, influence,
and counterinfluence, the origins have played a steadily diminishing role
in explaining the natures and states of the existing systems. Italian
scholar Giuseppe Chiovenda once commented that the contemporary
Italian procedure can be said to be "neither more Roman nor less
Germanic than the existing procedure of Germany.""15 However, a brief
discussion of the origins will be useful in understating the existing
peculiarities of the system.
Roman law has a very long history, but Justinian's sixth century
Corpus Juris Civilis is considered to be the most natural starting point
for purposes of contemporary analysis of the civil law legal tradition.116
The Corpus Juris Civilis consisted of four parts: The Code, which is the
collection of Roman legislation; the Digest, which is a treatise of the
most important writings; the Novels, which is imperial legislation
enacted in the years following the compilations of the Code and the
Digest; and finally the Institute, which is an introductory text for

112. Recounted in id.
113. See id.
114. The countries that are believed to be within the Romanic family include France, Italy,
Spain, Portugal, Belgium, the Netherlands, most countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. The
countries within the Germanic family include Austria, Switzerland, and Japan. See MATrEI ET AL.,
supranote 6, at 710.
115. Id. at 709 (quoting Giuseppe Chiovenda, Roman and Germanic Elements in Continental
Civil Procedure, in ENGELMANN, A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 875, 833, 912

(1983)).
116. The history stretches as far back as 450 B.C., i.e., the time of the Twelve Tables. See
GLENDON ET AL., supra note 34, at 18-20.
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students.1 17 The Code and the Digest together are considered to
represent an authoritative restatement of Roman law."t 8
Having remained dormant for centuries following the end of
Justinian's reign,11 9 the Corpus Juris Civilis was rediscovered in Italy
around the 11th century.120 After the rediscovery, the University of
Bologna became the center of the study of legal science in Europe.121
With the benefit of this very reaching and intellectually challenging set
of ancient legal materials, legal scholarship flourished and numerous
legal thinkers emerged, including Sir Thomas Aquinas in the 13th
century.122 According to Professor Glendon, thousands of European law
students who came to study in Bologna took back home with them not
only the laws that they studied but also the methods of their teaching.123
In this organic fashion, Roman law quickly spread throughout Europe
and beyond.124
Glendon suggests that its perceived intellectual
superiority is among those factors to be credited for its widespread
appeal and acceptance.1 25
The French Civil Code of 1804, which is commonly known as
"Code Napoleon," is now considered to be the pioneer of the modem
Civil Code, and consequently the most influential.126 The German Civil

117. Id.at20.
118. Id.
119. Professor Glenn notes that during this period of about 500 years, which followed the fall
of the Roman Empire, various kinds of chthonic laws re-asserted themselves across Europe and
elsewhere. See GLENN, supra note 41, at 145.
120. See GLENDON ET AL, supra note 34, at 24-25. Before that, it had served different rulers
through the ages. The Germans used it in ruling what was previously part of the Roman Empire.
According to Glendon:
Crude versions of Roman legal rules had become intermingled in varying degrees with
the customary rules of the Germanic invaders to the point where historians speak of the
laws during this period as either 'Romanized customary laws' or barbarized Roman
laws. Thus, though Roman legal science and Classical Roman law disappeared in the
welter, diversity and localism of Carbonnier's 'customary thicket', Romanist elements
survived and served both as a strand of continuity, and latent, potential universalizing
factor in what we now think of as the civil law tradition.
Id. at 22.
121. Id. at 24-25.
122. Id. at 25.
123. See id. at 26.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 25.
126. Id. at 34. The French Code was by no means the first of the modem codes, but it was the
most successful. Professor Ren6 David attributes the successes to two factors: (1) it was the work
of an enlightened sovereign, (2) which was powerful enough to influence its acceptance. See
DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 6, at 64-65.
The failed prior codes include the Prussian
Allgemeines Landrechtof 1794, and the Austrian Civil Code of 1811. See id. at 65.
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Code of 1896 became perhaps the second most influential.127 Although
the French and German Civil Codes grew from the same roots, they took
divergent approaches and developed individually.128 The French Code,
drafted by a commission of four prominent jurists within a ver short
was
period of time and with a touch of the ideals of the revolution,
by
to
be
understood
able
and
general,
always meant to be flexible,
ordinary citizens.130 The German Civil Code, on the other hand, was a
very detailed project that took 'legal scientists' twenty years to
complete.131
It was constructed and worked out with the degree of technical
precision that had never been seen before in any legislation. A special
language was developed and employed consistently. Legal concepts
were defined and then used in the same way throughout. Sentence
construction indicated the location of the burden of proof. Through
elaborate cross-references, all parts of the Code supposedly interlocked
to form a logically closed system."132
While the French Code was adopted at the beginning of the industrial
revolution, the German Code had the benefit of being adopted at the end
of that era. 133
German legal thought, including legal realism,
jurisprudence of interests and sociological schools of thought, came to
have far-reaching influence across the world, including in the United
States.134 This brief discussion of the historical origin and evolution of
the civil law system is offered not only to show the divergent roots from
the common law discussed in the previous section but also to highlight
the reasons behind its intellectual sophistication.
In the 20th century, the civil code in Europe gradually decreased in
importance and relevance, due in part to the emergence of the regulatory
and bureaucratic state and the ceding of portions of state sovereignty to
supranational governing and judicial bodies established by international

127. See GLENDON ET AL., supra note 34, at 33.
128. Id. at 33-34
129. The Code is predicated on three ideological foundations: private property, freedom of
contract, and patriarchal family. See id. at 34-35.
130. Id. at 62.
131. Idat41.
132. Id. For a good outline of the system and organization of the two codes, see MATTEl ET
AL., supra note 6, at 404-19.
133. See GLENDON ET AL., supra note 34, at 42-43.
134. The writings of Holmes and Pound are believed to have that influence. Later on, the
works of Karl Llewellyn and other jurists who fled Germany to the United States during the
National Socialist period are considered to have significant influence in mainstream American legal
thought. Id. at 43-44.
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treaties. 13 5 Nonetheless, the fundamental notions of the civilian legal
tradition, and its peculiar characteristics, which are themselves the
products of its long history, continue to distinguish it from the common
law legal tradition. The fairly common and salient features of the
civilian system, in particular the distinguishing characteristic of the
procedures, are discussed below.
Professor Hazard summarizes the civil law's procedural system in
this manner:
Under the civil law procedural systems, the judge is responsible for
deciding a case according to the truth of the matter. The judge decides
both fact and law because there is no jury or anything like it. It is
assumed that the truth of the matter will be revealed by relevant
evidence. Under the civil law, it therefore follows that the judge is
responsible for eliciting relevant evidence." 136
With respect to the role of the party litigants, Hazard provides that the
parties are represented by advocates who assist the parties in presenting
their case, but that a fundamental difference in the roles of the advocate
as between the common law and civil law is that, rather than employing
cunning and trickery to skew the presentation of facts and applicability
of the law as in the common law, civilian advocates are conceived of as
assisting the judge in his or her quest for the truth, the fulfillment of the
judicial responsibility.1 3 7 Conceptually,
the advocates are supposed to provide comment and suggestions to the
judge, with a deference which varies from one civil law jurisdiction to
another. But at least in theory they have no power of initiative after
they have presented the claims and defenses in the pleadings, except
with the assent of the judge.13 8
This highlights several important assumptions and functions of the
civil law procedure. First, the judge is responsible for deciding all
aspects of the case.
Second, the judge's only objective and
responsibility is to find out the truth of the matter in the case before him.
Third, the judge gets no help from a jury in deciding issues of fact or
law. Fourth, the judge is responsible for eliciting all relevant evidence
from all sources. Fifth, the advocates' responsibility is to assist the
judge in collecting and analyzing the evidence. Finally, the advocates

135.
136.
137.
138.

See id. at 54.
See Hazard,supra note 74, at 1019.
Id. at 1019-20.
Id. at 1020.
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can only provide suggestions and comment to the judge, and once the
process is set in motion by the submission of the claim or defense they
may not perform any activities without the leave of the court.139
Although this succinct summary is fairly representative of the most
common elements of the civil law system, it does not fully capture the
intricacies within each civil law country and the significant variations
that exist among the various civil law countries. Before a comparative
analysis of the common law and civil law procedures is offered in the
next section, some intricacies and variations are worth highlighting by
using the most developed models in Europe, i.e., the French and German
Codes.
The French system is perhaps the closest to the above description.
The French New Code of Civil Procedure enacted in the early 1970s is
probably the most currently important and relevant.140 Several of its
characteristics have come to be considered fundamental; two are salient
to the present discussion. First, although the judge is responsible for the
evidence, the parties share that responsibility under the judge's
guidance, including the examination of witnesses, the production of
documents and the commissioning of expert witnesses. 14 1 More
interestingly, the court is not limited to the application of the law
identified by the parties. It may reclassify a case, apply a different
provision of the law to the developed facts, and arrive at a conclusion.142
This reinforces the view that the judge is the seeker of the truth and the
guardian of the law, i.e., an honest broker.143 It must also be noted that
139. Id.
140. See BELL ET AL., supra note 40, at 86.
141. Id. at 87. Technically, the claimant bears the burden of proof; however, the opposing
party is required to help in adducing evidence. Id. (citing a decision by the French Court of
Cassation. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] civ. 1, Mar. 20, 2005, No.
123 (Fr.)).
142. See id. at 87-89. Article 12 of the French Civil Procedure Code states that "[The judge]
must give or restore the exact classification to the facts transactions [actes] which are the subject of
the litigation and not stay with the characterization suggested for them by the parties." Quoted in id.
at 88. Although this seems to be a correct representation of the civil procedure law as it stands
today, it is important to note that the whole notion of reclassification of case by the judge without
the parties submission is not entirely without controversy. Id. The new Civil Procedure Code
provides that, where the parties have agreed to keep their legal classification, i.e., if they identify the
law and ask the court to be governed by that (some sort of choice of law), the court is required to
apply that law alone not reclassify unless the case affects inalienable rights. Id. at 89.
143. Id. Note, however, that there is a suggestion in the literature that the involvement of the
judge may depend on the complexity of the case with more involvement in more complex cases and
more reliance on the parties' submissions in less complex cases. See, e.g., CATHERINE ELLIOTT,
CATHERINE VERNON & ERIC JEANPIERRE, FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 179-80 (2d ed. 2006)
(suggesting that in less complex cases, the judge's role is more or less like that of the judge in the
adversarial system).
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the notion of proof by balance of probabilities, or a preponderance of the
evidence, is more or less nonexistent. In the French system, "a fact is
either proven or not." 14 And second, in each case, a file called the
dossier is built by the court. 145 The dossier contains the claim, the
defense and all pieces of gathered evidence.14 6 Each party must have a
copy of this expansive record.14 7
Although principally inquisitorial, the German laws of civil
procedure seem to contain more elements of adversarial justice than the
French system. 148 The most important civil procedure law in German
is the Code of Civil Procedure, more commonly known as the ZPO.
There are several reasons why the ZPO is more just than other
adversarial systems. First, in all civil actions before the district court in
Germany, representation by counsel is mandatory. 50 This fact itself
suggests the level of expectation for counsel involvement. Stadler neatly
summarizes the remarkable aspect of the court's power and the parties'
roles:
The Court has an obligation to prepare the trial. It has the power to
demand that the parties elaborate fully on all relevant alleged facts.
Within the limits inherent in principle of party presentation, the court
will provide some guidance for the pleadings, and to some extent, will
even assist a party that failed to resent all relevant facts through
oversight, inadvertence or mistake.
The same basic principles underpin criminal and administrative
procedures in the civil law system. If anything, the procedures in the
public law arena demand more active involvement of judges and allow
less room for manipulation by counsel. For example, in France, criminal
proceedings are characterized by judicial investigation of the crime.1 52

144. See BELL ET AL., supranote 40, at 87.
145. Id. at 90.
146. Id. at 90-91.
147. Id. at 90.
148. See, e.g., HOwARD D. FISHER, THE GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM & LEGAL LANGUAGE 115
(2d ed. 1999). One of the maxims of the German civil procedure is that "it is for the parties to
proceedings to introduce facts and applications. The opposite of this principle is the so-called
'Inquisitionsprinizp' (examination maxim or inquisition principle), which applies, for example, in
criminal and administrative proceeding."
149. INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW 365 (Mathias Reimann & Joachim Zekoll eds., 2d ed.
2005). This was most recently amended in 2002. Id.
150. Id. at 367. Indigent plaintiffs and defendants do have a statutory right to counsel. Id.
151. Id. at 370 (citing ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], Jan. 1,
2002, § 139).
152. See WALTER CAIRNS & ROBERT MCKEON, INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 173 (1995)
(citing CODE CIVIL [C. civ] arts, 92, 97). French criminal procedure is governed by the Code of
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The judge d'instruction is empowered to collect evidence, including by
conducting searches and seizures, interviewing witnesses, and even
visiting the crime scene if necessary.15 3 The judge is required to look at
not only inculpatory evidence but also exculpatory evidence because the
mission of the judiciary is principally to find out the truth.15 4 After the
judge completes the investigation with the help of the prosecutor and the
defendant, she will issue a final report identifying the nature of the crime
and the possible charges that the government may pursue and submits
the dossier to the office of the procureur de la Republique, who in turn
forwards it to a panel of three judges who will decide whether
"Ifthey decide there is, then they issue the
prosecution is warranted.
formal charge... and transfer the case to the appropriate trial court."1 56
During the actual trial, the judge remains the principal actor, in
charge of conducting the lines of inquiry and the questions, although the
opposing parties are involved by suggesting questions they feel may be
appropriate or beneficial to their case. As Lerner puts it, "there is a
direct line of communication between the fact-finders and the
witness." 157 In fact, the prosecutor and defense council would face
disciplinary action, even disbarment, if they were ever to attempt to
contact and interview non-party witnesses, because that is the exclusive
domain of the judge.15 According to Professor Learner, who served as
an expert witness in a high profile criminal trial in France, the
flexible order of the trial allows witness testimony to resemble a
discussion. Witnesses can directly respond to the statements of other
witnesses, in a sort of dialogue. They are also allowed to speak in their
natural voices, initially in narrative form. Neither party has carefully
coached them before trial, the parties' direct and cross-examination do
Criminal Procedure of 1808, amended many times since its enactment. Id. at 169. The procedure is
complex, but the entire criminal prosecution and trial process seems to be divided into six distinct
stages: reporting of the offense, preliminary investigation by police and referral for judicial
investigation, judicial investigation of the crime by a judge and issuance of a report recommending
the institution of a criminal prosecution, the main trial, and enforcement of the outcome. See id. at
169-76. For a good overview of this process, see Ren~e Lettow Lerner, The Intersection of Two
Systems: An American on Trialfor an American Murder in the French Cour D'Assisses, 2001 U.
ILL. L. REV. 791 (2001).
153. See CAIRNS & McKEON, supra note 152, at 172-74.
154. See Lerner,supra note 152, at 802.
155. See id.at 801-02.
156. See id. at 805-806. This particular panel is the Chamber de l'instruction. Id. at 806.
157. See id at 807.
158. See id. at 802-03 (citing CODE CIVIL [C. CIv] arts. 101-02). He also notes that, as the
prosecutor is not technically a member of the bar, disbarment is not exactly the nature of the
penalty. See id.at 803 n.43 (relying on generally JOHN LEUDSDORF, MAN IN HIS ORIGINAL
DIGNITY: LEGAL ETHICS INFRANCE (2001)).

674

2012]

THE INQUISITORIAL ADVANTAGE

675

not constrain them, and their statements are not interrupted by
evidentiary objections. As a result, witnesses are more relaxed and
often forthcoming with information." 159
More interestingly, the French system does not strictly impose the
burden of proof on either of the parties. As such, the fact finder is asked
whether she is fully convinced that the alleged act occurred and that the
defendant is the one who caused it.160 This suggests that, in keeping
with the inquisitorial tradition, the parties and the judge collaboratively
establish the facts without allocating any particular burden, which is
conceptually different from the Anglo-American burden allocation
system. To one with an Anglo-American background, it could even be
difficult to understand. In any case, the most important aspect ofjudicial
investigation and active judicial involvement throughout the process is,
as Learner puts it, "An indigent defendant is not placed at such16a
disadvantage, having to rely on a poorly funded legal aid system," 1
including for the gathering and use of exculpatory evidence, as the
judicial investigator would do that for him. 162
Although German criminal procedure appears to be relatively more
adversarial than the French system, at least during trial, it is still
substantially similar. The German Code of Criminal Procedure of 1879
(StPO) still governs criminal prosecution in Germany.163 Under the
StPO, the criminal prosecution process has three distinct phases: (1)
investigation by the state attorney's office, which looks at both
(2) the submission of
inculpatory and exculpatory evidence; 1
indictment to the appropriate pretrial court, which determines whether
there is sufficient evidence warranting a trial, 16 and if so; (3) the
commencing of the actual trial. At trial, in keeping with the inquisitorial

159. See Lerner, supra note 152, at 853. He further notes that this system allows the defendant
to choose to speak in most cases. Id.
160. This might seem like the familiar Anglo-American "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard,
but Professor Learner suggests that the French version which reads: "Avez vous une intime
conviction?" is difficult to translate, but it could mean "Are you deeply, thoroughly convinced?"
See Lerner, supranote 152, at 800-01.
161. Id. at 801 (emphasis added).
162. Id. at 805-06. The judge's final decision, as well as preliminary rulings throughout the
investigation, may be appealed to the next level. The appellate court reviews both questions of law
and fact, including new facts as appropriate. See CAIRNS & MCKEoN, supra note 152, at 172-74.
163. Amended several times since its adoption in 1879, the German Criminal Procedure Code
(Strafprozessordnung stop) is the principal body of law that governs German Criminal Procedure. It
is supplemented with the Judicature Act (Gerichsverfassungsgesetz, or GVG). See REIMANN &
ZEKOLL, supra note 149, at 421-22.
164. See id. at 423 (citing STPO, §§ 158, 160, 162, 163, 167, and 169).
165. See id. (citing STPO, §§ 170, 200).
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tradition, the judge leads the presentation of evidence and questioning,
maintaining a prominent and active role.166 As in the French system,
and depending on the nature and severity of the crime, lay judges
participate in making the final decision.167
Notions of official investigation and party passivity also
characterize administrative proceedings in the civil law system. In
France, the rules of administrative procedures are contained in Code de
Justice Administrative.168 The administrative law system attempts to
balance two competing interests: the government's administrative task
and the protection of citizens from excesses and governmental abuse of
power. With this balance in mind, "judges do not rely on the parties to
provide them with those arguments on which they can rely in coming to
their decision ('decisive argument'): the case is constructed, the facts
unearthed, and the line of reasoning developed through the work of the
Although legal
judge rapporteurduring the stage of the instruction."
representation is available in most administrative proceedings, according
to Bell et al., "The lack of representation is unlikely to be damagingto a
literally taken over by
person's chances of success since ... the case is170
the court itselffrom the moment it is introduced."

In addition, administrative proceedings are also characterized by
the following stages: (1) the court appoints an officer, called the
rapporteur, to create a dossier of each case, which contains the
challenges, the administrative decision, and all the evidence; (2) all
administrative courts are empowered to seek and obtain relevant
documents from administrative agencies; (3) the rapporteur then
produces a note outlining the facts, the evidence, the law, and a draft
judgment, and then forwards it to the Commissaire du gouvernement,
At trial, the
which prepares a legal opinion, (4) that leads to trial.
rapporteurpresents the dossier by outlining the parties' arguments. The
parties are then invited by the administrative court to comment.172 The
Commissaire du gouvernement then reads their conclusions, concluding

the public hearing.173 The judges then consider all the arguments and
evidence in private and reach a decision that must address all points of
166.
167.
168.
apply in
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

See id. at 424-25 (citing STPO §§ 58, 213-225, 243, 244, 258, 260).
See id at 425.
Adopted in May 2000, the Code dejustice administrative consolidates all the rules that
all administrative courts. See BELL ET AL., supra note 40, at 119 & n.319.
Id. at 119.
Id. at 121 (emphasis added).
Id. at 123-24.
Id. at 124.
Id at 125.
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contention. 174 An appeal will lie either to Cour Administrative d'Appel
or to the Conseil d'Etat depending on the nature of the appeal.17 5 The
appellate tribunals may consider both questions of fact and law.' 7 6
As indicated above, the procedure is essentially inquisitorial in the
sense that judicial officials are in charge of the investigation of facts and
the application of law, with only limited help from the parties. In
relation to this, the role of the judicial officer charged with developing
the dossier is captured well in the following passage by French Jurists
Mossot and Marimbert: "The rapporteurmay be faced with applications
coming from ordinary citizens little versed in rules of law in which the
subject-matter or legal basis remains concealed rather than being made
In these cases, the rapporteur interprets the
clearly explicit."' 7
application in a constructive way, not confined to the letter of the appeal,
but also not contradicting what it says. This effort to reclassify
applications is most often made for the benefit of the applicant.17 8
Although the French immigration system is characterized by a
complex set of procedures at different levels, the same fundamental
notions of administrative law and procedure discussed above underpin
immigration adjudication, which is decidedly a part of the administrative
law system.' 79
Although German administrative law appears to be more
complicated because of German federalism, 80 administrative
proceedings are similarly inquisitorial.81 An interesting aspect of this is
that, even if a party, which may include a government agency, fails to
cooperate, the adjudicating authority is authorized and required, within

174. See id. at 125.
175. See L. NEVILLE BROWN &JOHN S. BELL, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 115 (1992).
176. Id. It is important to note here that the duality of the French court system-the regular
courts and the administrative courts-has a long history and that judicial review of administrative
decisions in the context of the Anglo-American system is unknown. The French administrative
system is self contained. For a good discussion of the position of the administrative courts within
the French constitutional system of separation of powers, see id.at 8-58.
177. Id. at 96-97 (quoting J. MASSOT & J. MARIMBERT, LE CONSEIL D'ETAT 153 (1988).
178. Id.
179. See Helene Lambert & Janine Silga, TransnationalRefugee law in the French Courts:
Deliberateor Compelled Change in JudicialAttitude?, in THE LIMITS OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW:
REFUGEE LAW, POLICY, HARMONIZATION AND JUDICIAL DIALOGUE INTHE EUROPEAN UNION 3741 (Guy S. Goodwin-Gill & H616ne Lambert eds., 2010). (A detailed discussion of French
immigration procedures is outside the scope of this paper as its focus is on the techniques of the
inquisitorial system in general whether it is used in the immigration context or otherwise.)
180. For a discussion of the administrative system, see REIMANN & ZEKOLL, supra note 149, at
87-103.
181. See id. at 103-04.
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reasonable limits, to ascertain the merits of the case ex officio.182 The
German immigration system is fragmented and complicated because of
federalism; however, it is a part of the administrative law system sharing
the same characteristics of the inquisitorial model.183
C.

A ComparativeLook at the InquisitorialandAdversarial
Advantages

Comparing the merits and demerits of the adversarial and
inquisitorial systems outside of a particular context may be difficult to
put in perspective. There is also a high risk of over-generalization.
Instead, understanding the arguments on both sides in a specific context
is essential in assessing the lessons that one can learn from the other.
For that reason, before the U.S. immigration deportation proceedings are
assessed and the inquisitorial model considered in the next part, this
section examines a set of notable scholarly exchanges in the context of
civil procedure.184 Evidently, no system can now be said to be entirely
adversarial or entirely inquisitorial. However, some basic differences
among each system do exist. In 1985, Professor John Langbein, the
preeminent comparatist, published his most provocative article, titled
This article attracted
"The German Advantage in Civil Procedure."
immense attention and many written responses by prominent scholars.
Some questioned the accuracy of the claims while others challenged the
underlying assumptions. The two most thoughtful reactions were "The
American Advantage: The Value of Inefficient Litigation" by Professor
Samuel Gross,186 and "The German Advantage in Civil Procedure: A
Plea for More Details and Fewer Generalities in Comparative
182. See id at 105 (citing § 24 of the German Federal Administrative Act, called
Untersuchungsgrundsatz (or "VwVfG")).
183. See Paul Tiedemann, The Use of Foreign Asylum Jurisprudence in the German
Administrative Courts, in THE LIMITS OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW, supra note 179, at 57-62.
184. Although comparing the immigration adjudication systems in the inquisitorial and
adversarial legal traditions might seem more relevant, the basic inquisitorial and adversarial
approaches share the same basic characteristics across specific areas of law. Because the focus here
is on the system of adjudication in general rather than the specific area, the debate in the civil
procedure context is equally instructive. It is chosen because it fully captures the merits and
demerits of each system of adjudication. Moreover, the purpose of this article is not to provide a
comparative study of immigration adjudication systems. Its purpose is limited to showing how the
inquisitorial model might be a desirable technique regardless of how it is employed in the
immigration context in civil law countries. This article does not endorse any particular immigration
adjudication model. It merely purports to show the advantages of using the basic inquisitorial
model in U.S. deportation proceedings.
185. Langbein, supra note 31.
186. Gross, supranote 31, at 734.
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Scholarship" by Professor Ronald Allen and others.187 The discussions
in these articles brilliantly capture the perceived advantages and
disadvantages of the adversarial and inquisitorial systems in the context
of civil procedure with some reference to criminal procedure. Quite
interestingly, the discussions which began in the context of civil
procedure quickly became adversarial advocacies for one or the other
system, making them excellent additions to the literature in this area.
The following discussion draws on these sources in evaluating the
advantages of the adversarial and inquisitorial systems, setting the stage
for the evaluation of the U.S. system for detention and deportation of
non-citizens and the recommendation in the next section for the adoption
of the inquisitorial model.
Langbein boldly asserts that the German inquisitorial system is
fundamentally superior to that of the U.S. adversarial system. His
arguments are very instructive and are examined as follows:
1. The adversarial system provides incentives for the distortion of
evidence because the system relegates the gathering and
presentation of evidence to partisans who choose evidence that
is supportive only of their respective positions. He notes that the
parties necessarily engage in "truth-defeating distortions."18 8
The inquisitorial system, on the other hand, relies on judicial
fact-gathering, which means that a neutral official gathers all the
evidence with a view to finding out the truth, not prevailing
against an adversary. 8 9
2. Judicial control of the evidence gathering and analysis brings
efficiency and fairness because: (a) it eliminates the bifurcation
of the processes into the plaintiffs case and the defendant's
case, as the entire inquiry is focused on finding out what really
happened; and (b) if the judicial inquiry finds that there is a
sufficient defense, no time or resources are wasted by
proceeding with the plaintiffs case, which means greater
efficiency. 190
3. Unlike the common law system, the culminating event called
"the trial" does not have the same meaning as a dramatic show

187. Allen et al., supra note 31.
188. See Langbein, supra note 31, at 823, 825.
189. Id.at 824.
190. See id. at 830. One example that he provides relates to a contract dispute. If the judge
finds out that the contract is vitiated by illegality, she would require the plaintiff to go through
providing evidence as to the formation of the contract etc., she would just focus on the illegality and
dispose of the case on that ground alone. Id.
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where the parties are the sparring opponents and the judge the
passive umpire.191 The inquisitorial method "lessens tension
and theatrics, and it encourages settlement." Moreover, "[w]hen
the court inquires and directs, it sets no stage for advocates to
perform. The forensic skills of counsel can wrest no material
advantage," which potentially equalizes the haves and the havenots.192
4. Witness preparation or coaching in the adversarial system is a
guarantee for distortion because "it is the rare case in which
either side yearns to have the witnesses, or anyone, give the
whole truth.'193
5. The assumption that cross-examination is the best tool to
eliciting the truth and correcting the bias of a prepared witness is
fundamentally flawed because it is "too often ineffective to undo
the consequences of skillful coaching[][and] . . . allows so much

latitude for bullying and other truth-defeating stratagems [that] it
is frequently the source of fresh distortion when brought to bear
against truthful testimony."l94
6. Partisan-hired and presented expert witnesses are even worse
because they have perverse incentives. 19 5 "If the experts do not
191. See BELL, supra note 40, at 85 ("There is no 'trial' in the common law sense in French
civil procedure.") (quoting J. Beardsley, ProofofFact in French Civil Procedure,34 AM, J. COMP.
L. 459, 480 (1986)); see also Astrid Standler & Wolfgang Hau, The Law of Civil Procedure, in
INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW, supra note 149, at 369-70 ("Under German law, the distinction
between the trial and pretrial phase of litigation is less sharp than in common law countries. It has
even been said that conducting a lawsuit in a civil law system such as Germany consists rather of
piecemeal litigation characterized by the predominance of written elements and that there is nothing
that could be properly called a trial.") (citing Hein Kotz, Civil Justice Systems in Europe and the
U.S., 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 61, 72 (2003)).
192. Langbein, supra note 31, at 831. To this point, he adds the possibility of witness surprise
and trickery in cross-examination, etc.
193. Id. at 833 (quoting Frankel, supra note 38, at 1038) (emphasis in original). Langbein adds
that, "If we had deliberately set out to find a means of impairing the reliability of witness testimony,
we could not have done much better than the existing system of having partisans prepare witnesses
in advance of trial and examine and cross-examine them at trial." Id.
194. Id. Langbein acknowledges Wigmore's famous saying that cross-examination is "the best
legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth," citing 5 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 29 (3d
ed. 1940), but counters it by quoting Judge Frankel who said, "The litigator's devices, let's be clear,
have utility in testing dishonest witnesses, ferreting out falsehood, and thus exposing the truth. But
to a considerable degree these devices are like other potent weapons, equally lethal for heroes and
villains." Id. at 833 n.31 (quoting Frankel, supra note 38, at 1039).
195. Id. at 835.
At the American trial bar, those of us who serve as expert witnesses are known as
"saxophones." This is a revealing term, as slang often is. The idea is that the lawyer
plays the tune, manipulating the expert as though the expert were a musical instrument
on which the lawyer sounds the desired notes . . . Nobody wants to
disappoint a patron;
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cancel each other out, the advantage is likely to be with the
expert whose forensic skills are the more enticing." 196
7. Perhaps Langbein's most interesting point relates to what he
calls in German "Waffenungleichheit" or, as he quite literally
puts it, "inequality of weapons, or in this instance, inequality of
counsel." He notes that "in a fair fight the pugilists must be well
matched."l 97 He gives it context when he notes "you cannot
send me into a ring with Mohammed Ali if you expect a fair
fight."198 Langbein's main point is that "very little in our
adversary system is designed to match the combatants of
comparable prowess, even though adversarial prowess is a main
99
factor affecting the outcome of litigation."
8. Langbein also addresses the three most fundamental criticisms
of the inquisitorial system corresponding with the advantages of
(a) premature judgment, or the
the adversarial system:
possibility that the investigating judge may arrive at a
conclusion before she has had the opportunity to see all the
evidence.200 In response, Langbein says that, although the
advocates in the inquisitorial system are not as active as those in
the adversarial system, they help the judge's investigation by
representing their client's views and direct the judge to evidence
that helps them. 20 1 He does not see any advantages in keeping
the judge deliberately ignorant until the day of the trial. 20 In
any case, he suggests that the propensity for making a premature
judgment depends on judicial temperament and experience,
which could be remedied through careful recruitment and proper
training.203 (b) Individual autonomy. Langbein notes that the
celebration of the adversarial system comes from the criminal
process, which rests on some very basic foundations: the
presumption of innocence, the privilege against selfincrimination, and requiring proof of guilt beyond a reasonable

and beyond this psychological pressure is the financial inducement.
Id.
196. Id. at 836.
197. Id. at 843.
198. Id.
199. Id. The rest of the paragraph reads: "Adversary theory thus presupposes a condition that
adversary practice achieves only indifferently." Id.
200. Id. at 843-44.
201. Id. at 844.
202. Id at 848.
203. See id at 848-5 1.

681

682

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[45:647

doubt.204 In other words, the adversarial system protects the
accused person's right to gather his own evidence and present it
in any way he wishes, rather than relegating that duty to a
judicial officer. Lacking a strong argument against this,
Langbein brushes it aside by saying that although he does not
see the merits of a system that deliberately attempts to err on one
side; albeit understandable in the criminal context, he argues that
in any case none of this affects his argument in the civil
context. 205 (c) Bureaucratic inefficacy and abuse. The career
judiciary is a large bureaucracy, prone to misuse of judicial
power. 6 And yet Langbein argues that proper recruitment and
retention evaluations coupled with the right incentives and
appellate control could meaningfully deter and correct potential
abuses. He cites the rarity of complaints about the German
judiciary as a case in point.
One of the first responders to Langbein's arguments was Professor
Samuel Gross. In his article, "The American Advantage," Gross reduces
Langbein's claim of the German-style inquisitorial advantage to
efficiency,208 accepts the proposition as true,209 but argues that
efficiency is not necessarily a virtue.2o Ironically, in praising American
inefficiency, Gross demonstrates the kind of skillful adversarial
advocacy with which Langbein was concerned. Gross defends
inefficiency and he does it well. The key points of his argument are:
1. Accuracy: The measure of a system is not speed or efficiency,
but accuracy. Langbein provides no evidence that German
inquisitorial outcomes are more accurate.211 Gross cites a study
which concludes that "adversary presentation of argument was
more likely than non-adversarial argument to counteract a bias

204. Id. at 842 & n.68 (citing Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655 (1976) (noting that
"the preservation of an adversary system of criminal justice" is "the fundamental purpose of the
Fifth Amendment.")).
205. See id at 842-43.
206. See id at 853-55.
207. See id. at 854-57.
208. See Gross, supra note 31, at 734 ("Roughly, Professor Langbein argues that by
comparison to the German process, American litigation is overly complex, expensive, slow, and
unpredictable-in short, inefficient.")
209. Id. ("Professor Langbein is also quite convincing; some may disagree but I, for one, have
no basis to dispute his claims, and no impulse to try.")
210. Id. ("The point of this paper is different: to question the assumption that efficiency in
adjudication is a virtue.")
211. Id at 740.
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2 12
about the outcome that was deliberately implanted in judges."
He eventually discounts it, however, convinced that it is
impossible to control the experimental environment. 2 13 He
eventually concludes that the comparison of accuracy between
the German and American systems is not possible to measure.214
However, he notes that consistency might be a proxy to measure
accuracy. 15 That means any deviation from the mode might be
considered inaccurate.216 But even by that measure, Gross is not
able to say that the adversarial system is better. 2 17 That leaves
him to discuss the role and importance of the jury in arriving at a
more accurate result in criminal cases.218 For that, he has good
evidence in his favor. According to a study that he calls solid,
"trial judges thought the defendant should be acquitted only half
as often as the juries did." 2 19 He recognizes, however, that what
the study compares is variations within the same system, i.e.,
judge versus jury in the adversarial system, and he recognizes
that it is possible that the use of juries in criminal trials in the
inquisitorial system may contain the same guarantee of
-220
minimizing wrongful convictions.
2. Intrinsic value: by this term, Gross means the political and
cultural arguments in favor of the adversarial system.2 2 1
Characteristics of this are distrust of government and respect for
individual autonomy. 222 The system protects these values
through the use of juries and a rovision of representation for
the accused in criminal trials. 22 Related to this, people are
more likely to accept a system that gives them autonomy, and
Gross notes that the system has "symbolic and ceremonial

212. See id at 740 & n.22 (citing JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE,
A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 41-53 (1975)).

213. For example, the study used college students and first-year law students, which means that
it did not account for the experiences ofjudges. See id. at 740 n.22.
214. Id. at 741.
215. Id. at 741-42.
216. Id.
217. See id. In fact, he comes to the opposite conclusion: "if the mode defines truth, then the
variance is error, and the German system has less of it." Id. at 742.
218. Id at 743-44.
219.

(1966)).
220.
221.
222.
223.

See id at 744 (citing HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 58

This study analyzed 3,500 jury trials. Id.
Id. at 744.
Id. at 744-45.
Id. at 745.
Id. at 744-46.
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importance" as it gives the "appearance of justice." 224 He
"But comparisons are
concludes these points by saying:
difficult because, on the whole, the cathartic impact of legal
ceremonies is culturally bound and culturally determined. 225In
law as in religion, the ceremonies that affect us most are usually
those that are most familiar." 226
3. Having summarized the comparative advantages and
disadvantages under the above two headings and having
concluded that neither accuracy nor intrinsic value conclusively
support a claim of adversarial superiority, Gross goes on to
present his most important argument, i.e., that inefficiency may
be beneficial and desirable for several reasons. First, efficien2
is a product of specialization, which is necessarily complex.
If it is complex, it is harder to set up and almost impossible to
fix if it fails.228 To support this point, he notes that "unless you
can operate a word processor or a computer reliably, a
typewriter will serve you better."229 Second, homogeneity
makes the operation of a complex and efficient judicial
bureaucracy easier, while American diversity and its fragmented
political system make that kind of system almost impossible to
He concedes that the
set up and successfully manage.
adversarial system produces inefficient and uneven justice, but
he asks "[c]ould a switch make matters worse?" Answering that
question in the affirmative, he goes on stating: "a bad civil-law
system would be worse than anything the common law can
produce. Incompetent or dishonest judges and investigating
prosecutors would be slower, less consistent, and less accurate
than any cast of private advocates and lay jurors, and entrenched
bureaucracies are notoriously hard to displace." 2 31 This being
Gross' main and perhaps most convincing argument, he goes on
offering more reasons why an inefficient system is better.

224. Id. at 745-47.
225. Id. at 747.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 748.
228. See id. at 749-50. He emphasizes that when it does not work, it really does not work. As
an example, he quotes an Italian jurist as saying: "The Italian legal system is like the German,
except that it does not work." Id. at 750.
229. See id. at 749.
230. See id. at 750-51.
231. Id.at751.
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4. Deterrence of litigation: Simply stated, Gross' position is that if
the system is inefficient, people don't use it-that reduces
caseload which means less litigation and less resource
burden.232 That is one reason why the great majority of cases
settle outside of court in America.233 However, he does not
convincingly explain away the fact that such a system would
favor the more powerful party. This leads to his next point.234
5. Creation of the "zone of immunity": By this he means that if all
draconian laws that we have enacted are enforced with great
efficiency, which could mean a violation ticket for driving 66
miles per hour in a 65 zone, it could impinge upon individual
autonomy and privacy in ways that are not familiar to us.235
6. Virtues of informal interactions and settlements: These kinds of
informal private settlements produce rules that are difficult to
write in the form of legislation due to "their relative flexibility,
and their responsiveness to interests that legal systems are hard
pressed to regulate-trust, reputation, civility, etc." 2 36 But then,
it is important to maintain an inefficient "coercive option . . .
that is rarely used ... to keep the normative system intact." 237
For all of these reasons, Gross prefers an inefficient adversarial
system over an efficient inquisitorial system. Most notable and most
relevant for purposes of this article is that our democracy cannot avoid
making draconian laws and we are better off without efficient
enforcement of these laws.238 Although it may be a very odd way of
seeking immunity in a democratic system, the reality in the immigration
context may support Gross' assertion. 239 But this also means that the
good laws are not enforced efficiently, and that the less powerful are
likely to lose in a system of self-help. Apart from this, a closer reading
of Gross' article suggests that in fact, he agrees with all of Langbein's
assertions about the superiority of the inquisitorial system, but he thinks
that we are culturally incapable of setting up a German-type efficient
system and that we like our system just fine and believe that inefficiency
serves us well.

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id. at 752-53.
Id. at 752.
See id. at 752-54.
Id. at 753.
Id. at 756.
Id.
Id. at 755.
Id
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Allen et al. admit that if what Lanbein says about the German
However, they doubt the
system is true, it is a superior system.
accuracy of the characterization, hence the title of their article, "A Plea
for more details . ...241 They address each of the important points that
Langbein makes and express doubts about their accuracy. 42 Most
interestingly, the preoccupation of the article is not to challenge the
claim of superiority of the inquisitorial system as a system of
adjudication, but rather to challenge the claim that the system as
implemented in Germany is superior.243 They focus mostly on three
aspects of Langbein's claims: the procedures, the use of experts and the
qualifications and incentives of judges.
1. The procedures: At the level of efficiency, Allen et al. note that
more than 90 percent of cases in America settle outside of court
or through dismissal.244 Langbein's claim of the excesses of
cross-examination and surprise of witnesses are exaggerated,
they argue, because the evidentiary rules restrict the perceived
Langbein's claim about witness-coaching is
excesses.245
In
considered speculative and lacking in supporting data.24
when
Langbein
believe
we
should
why
they
ask
simple terms,
he says that Wigmore's assertion, that cross-examination is "the
greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth," is
"nothing more than an article of faith." 24 7
2. Experts: Citing some studies, Allen et al. note that experts
cannot be categorically classified and that their professional
ethics are more important than the incentives the system
provides.248 On the other hand, there is no guarantee that courtpaid experts do not experience the same kind of pressure and
incentives as party-hired ones. If that is not the case, Langbein

240. See Allen et al., supra note 31, at 706. ("Professor Langbein provides his instruction on
methods of improving the administration of civil justice at a high level of generality. If the
generalities that he invokes are true, then he has made a powerful argument that the American
system is decidedly inferior to the German system in certain important respects and we would do
well to embrace aspects of that system. If the generalities are false, Professor Langbein's article
reduces to the mere articulation of a preference for the German system with no supporting
rationale.").
241. See id. at 707.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 708.
244. Id. at 711.
245. Id. at 717-18.
246. Id. at 718-19.
247. Id. at 720. (quoting WIGMORE, supranote 194, at 29).
248. Id. at 737.

686

2012]

THE INQUISITORIAL ADVANTAGE

687

provides no evidence. To the contrary, German experts are
often known as "secret judges." 249
3. The recruitment and training of judges: "[The] judicial career
attracts persons 'who feel in a particular way bound to the
traditional norms and structures of society and want to protect
them from change."'25o Citing to some supporting data, they
suggest that after all is said and done, judicial recruitment and
training in Germany is not as glamorous or as self-contented as
Langbein suggests.
Allen's main point, as indicated above, is that the German system is
not superior. The article does nothing to discredit the inquisitorial
system, if indeed it is set up the way Langbein says it is. Neither Allen
nor Gross find fault inherent in the inquisitorial system. Most
interestingly, they focus on issues that are, at best, tangential to
Langbein's argument, but their immediate and decidedly vigorous and
negative reaction, along with the content of their writing, tells a more
important and coherent story: what sustains the adversarial system is
tradition rather than common sense and reason. This assertion is more
accurate when it comes to adversarial deportation proceedings, which
will be the subject of the next section.
III. THE ADVERSARIAL DISADVANTAGE IN DEPORTATION
PROCEEDINGS
A few years ago, two of this writer's students represented an
asylum-seeker from a troubled African country facing removal
proceedings in the United States.252 When we first interviewed the
client in a detention facility, he told us that friends of his mailed him a
package from France, where he had stayed for a while before attempting
to enter Canada via the United States. He said that the Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) gave him the package, which had been
opened and apparently inspected. We asked ICE if there were any
documents that they took out of the package. ICE told us to submit a
FOIA request to receive an answer. Recognizing that a FOIA request
would entail several additional months of detention for our client, we
249. See id. at 738.
250. See id. at 746 (quoting WOLFGANG KAUPEN, DIE HOTER VON RECHT UND ORDNUNG 19293 (1969)).
251. Seeid.at746-61.
252. The names of the client, the students, the Government's counsel and the location of the
trial are withheld, and on file with the author. (All of the information, including the names and
addresses of the students, who are now practicing attorneys, can be provided upon request).
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went back to the client, explained the circumstances to him, and asked
him if there might have been anything in the package that he would
think could be either helpful or damaging to his asylum claim. The
client positively assured us that it was impossible that they could find
any evidence in that package that could undermine his asylum claim.
Confident about the assurance, the students prepared the claim and the
court scheduled it for an individual hearing, which in removal
proceedings, is the actual trial.
On the day of the trial, the two very young third year law students,
who had never had any kind of trial experience before, took their seats
next to the Assistant Chief Counsel representing the United State
Unfortunately for them, the government's counsel
Government.
happened to be a very experienced, excellent litigator whose skills are
only surpassed by his zeal. The judge appeared by video and the court
was called to order. As the written record had already been developed,
the judge asked the student-attorneys to present witness testimony. They
conducted examination-in-chief of their client and elicited all the
relevant information. He consistently and credibly testified about the
persecution that he had endured in his home country. At the time, it was
uncontested that in that country, about a thousand people were being
killed every day. The examination-in-chief took about 45 minutes, after
which the judge gave the Government's counsel the opportunity to
cross-examine our client. After nearly three hours of cross-examination,
which touched upon all aspects of the initial testimony and more, the
Government's counsel began its final line of questions. They are
reproduced from memory as follows:
1. Government: When you left your country, were you in
possession of a passport issued by your home government?
Client: No.
2. Government: When you left your country, did you have any
other kind of official document issued by your home
government?
Client: Only my driver's license.
3. Government: Let me ask you again: Did you have a passport
with you when you left your country.
Client: No.
4. Government: I'll give you a final chance: have you ever had a
passport issued to you by your home government at any time?
Client: I already said no, and the answer to that question is
again no, I have never had a passport issued under my name by
my home government.
688
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At that point, the Government's counsel pulled a passport-looking
document out of his briefcase and asked the judge's permission to
approach the witness and show it to him. We obviously vigorously
objected on many grounds, including unfair surprise, evidence obtained
through an egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment, and violation
of due process in general. At that point, we disclosed to the judge our
suspicion that the Government obtained that document unlawfully from
the package that was mailed to our client. Faced with a serious
dilemma, the judge came up with a clever compromise: he excluded the
admissibility of the evidence but allowed the use of the evidence for
impeachment purposes. When the sole source of the evidence is
essentially the witness's statement, its impeachment necessarily meant
loss or removal where our client was concerned. Seeing the trial lost by
this underhanded tactic, in the face of a witness whose testimony was so
convincing and so compelling and so consistent with all objective
evidence of the country's conditions, including the State Department's
own report, seemed to be devastating to everyone involved, except
perhaps the Government's Counsel. Finally, after we were given the
opportunity to inspect the document first, the government's counsel
approached the witness, confronted him with the document and asked,
"Isn't this a passport issued to you by your home government?" To
everybody's surprise, the witness said "No, this is the driver's license
that I told you about." Fortunately for the client and his counsels, that
document was indeed a driver's license that only looked like a passport.
The confusion was exacerbated because the text was in French and the
Government's counsel had never had it translated. That Perry Mason
exchange concluded the four-hour ordeal and the judge granted asylum
without hesitation.
What if that document was a passport as the government's counsel
believed and the client had said "Yes, and sorry, but I did not think you
had it." Without a doubt, that would have destroyed his credibility and
hence, his asylum claim. It would have been a dramatic win for the
government, although there would have been no way to know why the
client felt that he had to conceal his passport. It is possible that he might
be hiding something of no consequence at all, but it would have been
enough to destroy his credibility and his chances for a successful asylum
application. The kind of tactic that the Government's counsel employed
is a classic adversarial tool. To make matters worse for the non-citizen,
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the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in deportation
proceedings.25 3
This section looks at the relevant sources of rules that make this
kind of unnecessary confrontation possible. It examines the perceived
roles of the judge, the government's counsel, the respondent, and the
respondent's counsel under existing rules and custom.
A.

The Nature ofDeportationProceedingsunder the INA and
Regulations

At its formation, the polity of the United States was predicated on
the notions of "limited government, negative freedom, and laissez-faire
economics," and did not envision the government's role to be anything
more than the protection of life, liberty, and property.254 As society
grew in size and complexity, the original three branches of government
became incapable of handling the increasing complexity. This led to the
creation of the "fourth branch of government," or the administrative
state.255 The administrative system was given a broad delegation of
power to perform the government's complex tasks in a more efficient
and expedited manner than the formal legislative and judicial process
could possibly perform.256 The tasks of the administrative system
include rulemaking and adjudication, which could be formal adversarial
adjudication. 257

253. See generally Won Kidane, Revisiting the Rules ofProcedure and Evidence Applicable in
AdversarialAdministrative DeportationProceedings: Lessons from the Departmentof LaborRules
of Evidence, 57 CATH. U. L. REv. 93 (2008) (In that article, I argued that the lack of formal rules of
evidence might be one of the reasons that make this kind of irregularity and unfairness possible. I
still maintain that position in lieu of the more fundamental change that this article proposes).
254. See STEVEN J. CANN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 9 (4th ed. 2006).
255. See Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting) (using the "fourth branch" for the first time, stating that the rise of the administrative
state is the most significant legal development of the last century). For a good discussion of the
place of administrative agencies within the constitutional framework, see generally Peter L. Strauss,
The Place ofAgencies in Government: Separation ofPowers and the FourthBranch, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 573 (1984). Administrative rules enacted by the First Congress related only to customs and
veterans' benefits. Before the Civil War, around eleven administrative agencies existed, which
included the Internal Revenue Service and the Patent Office. By 1941, that number had grown to
fifty-one. See William H. Kuehnle, Standards of Evidence in Administrative Proceedings, 49
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 829, 836 (2004-2005).
256. Such delegation has never been without controversy. See, e.g., Ruberoid,343 U.S. at 48789 (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("Administrative Agencies have been called quasi-legislative . . .").
257. See Michael H. Graham, Application of the Rules of Evidence in Administrative Agency
Formal Adversarial Adjudication: A New Approach, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 353, 353. For a
comprehensive treatment of the functions of Administrative agencies, see generally WILLIAM F.

690

2012]

THE INQUISITORIAL ADVANTAGE

691

The delegation of the judicial function of adjudicating cases and
controversies to executive administrative agencies has always faced a
serious doctrinal and procedural dilemma. For example, in the 1930s,
the American Bar Association noted that "The judicial branch of the
federal government is being rapidly and seriously undermined ... . [So
far as possible, the decision of controversies of a judicial character must
be brought back into the judicial system." 258 The choice then became
between bringing the resolution of controversies back to the court
system and bringing court rules to the administrative system. As the
benefits of administrative adjudication had become so well-recognized
by then, "[t]he effort later turned from bringing administrative
proceedings into a federal court system to bringing court standards into
the administrative proceedings." 25
By enacting the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in 1946,
Congress attempted to strike a reasonable compromise between formal
judicial rules and informal administrative procedures.260 For example,
the APA states:
Any oral or documentary evidence may be received, but the agency as
a matter of policy shall provide for the exclusion of irrelevant,
immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence. A sanction may not be
imposed or rule or order issued except on consideration of the whole
record or those parts of thereof cited by a party and supported by and
in accordance with reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.
Although the numerosity of adjudicative administrative agencies does
not allow for a singular conclusion, some are apparently more
adversarial than others. In fact, it is suggested that administrative
proceedings resemble federal non-jury trials in all aspects.262 According
to the Supreme Court, "the role of the modern . . . administrative law

judge . . . [is] functionally comparable to that of a judge." 2 63 Although

FUNK, SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & RUSSELL L. WEAVER, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE

5, 32-47 (4th ed. 2010).
258. See 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.4, at 12 (4th ed. 2002)
(quoting 59 A.B.A.R. 539, 549 (1934)).
259. See Kuehnle, supra note 255, at 843-44.
260. See Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946)
(codified as amended in 5 U.S.C.).
261. APA § 7(c); 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2000).
262. See Elliot B. Glicksman, The Modern Hearsay Rule Should Find Administrative Law
Application, 78 NEB. L. REv. 135, 144 (1999). According to the Supreme Court, a "fundamental . .
. purpose [of the APA was] to curtail and change the practice of embodying in one person or agency
the duties of prosecutor and judge." See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 41 (1950).
263. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978) (quotations omitted).
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doctrinally a part of this legacy, deportation proceedings are subject to
their own exclusive rules of procedure under the INA and related
regulations.264 The following subsections briefly discuss the nature of
adversarial deportation proceedings from the perspective of the actors
and highlight the shortcomings.
B.

The Role of the Government's Counsel (ICE)

The enduring debate about whether the government's lawyer
represents the interests of the particular agency that hires her, or those of
the president, or even those of the public in general, seems to have no
reasonable resolution.265 However, perhaps the most important source
of federal law that provides guidance on the issue of the role of the
government's lawyer is the Citizens' Protection Act of 1998.266 That
Act provides that Department of Justice lawyers, which include ICE
counsel, are subject to "State laws and rules and local Federal court rules
governing attorneys in each State where such attorney engages in that

264. See INA § 240(a)(3) ("Unless otherwise specified in this chapter, a proceeding under this
section shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for determining whether an alien may be admitted
to the United States or ... removed."). See also 8 C.F.R. § 240 (2007) (providing the details of the
procedures). It is important to note, however, that although these rules are similar to the APA rules,
the APA rules themselves are not directly applicable in immigration proceedings. This is so
because of a set of Supreme Court decisions that were rendered beginning in 1950. The first of
these was Wong Yang Sung, 339 U.S. 33 (1950). In that case, the Supreme Court held that the APA
was applicable in immigration proceedings. Id. at 33, 51, 53. This decision was rendered two years
before the adoption of the most comprehensive immigration law, i.e., the INA, in 1952. A few
years later, in Marcello v. Bonds, the Supreme Court held that the INA is the only source of rules
for immigration adjudication and as such the APA did not apply. See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S.
302, 309-10 (1955) ("[W]e cannot ignore the background of the 1952 immigration legislation, its
laborious adaptation of the Administrative Procedure Act to the deportation process, the specific
points at which deviation from the Administrative Procedure Act were made, the recognition in the
legislative history of this adaptive techniques and of the particular deviations, and the direction in
the statute that the methods therein prescribed shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for
deportation proceedings."). The Supreme Court reaffirmed this decision ten years later in Ardestani
v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1991) (stating that the INA is the sole and exclusive source of
procedural rules in deportation proceedings).
265. See, e.g., FUNK ET AL., supranote 257, at 32-47. For example, a Report by the District of
Columbia Bar Special Committee on Government Lawyers and the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct has concluded that because the "public interest" and even "the government" are amorphous
concepts, the responsibility of the government's lawyer is to the agency that she works for.
Excerpts of the Report are reproduced in id.at 35-37 ("This analysis inevitably led to the conclusion
that the employing agency should normally be regarded as the client of the government lawyer. In
most cases, the employing agency will be a discrete entity, clearly definable and the source of
identifiable lines of authority. The lawyer's duties typically will be directed by the head of the
agency or his delegate; the lawyer's explicit responsibility will be limited to those assigned by the
agency; and agency regulations provide a clear benchmark of assessing attorney conduct.").
266. Codified at 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a) (1998).
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attorney's duties, to the same extent and in the same manner as other
attorneys in that State." 2 67 Accordingly, the important subsidiary
sources include state, federal, and local rules of professional conduct.
Although there are variations at the state level, the ABA Model Rules
may be taken as an example. At the federal level, most agencies do have
their own disciplinary rules, which include Immigration Regulations.268
These sources are discussed as follows.
Under the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which are
adopted by many states, a lawyer must represent her client with
appropriate competence,299 diligence, and zeal.270 The rules require
organization lawyers, which include government lawyers, to act in the
best interest of the organization.271 They may make any and all nonfrivolous claims to advance their client's interest.272 Prosecutors in
criminal cases are subject to additional rules, which require them to
uphold the rule of law while maintaining their prosecutorial zeal. 273
Zealous advocacy can take many different forms. An often cited
example in recent years is John Yoo's "torture memo," which advised
President Bush that U.S. law banned extreme acts only, which
Though the
essentially justified acts such as water boarding.274
government later withdrew it as lacking "care and sobriety,"2 7 some
observers even characterized it as "standard lawyerly fare, routine
stuff."27 6 There is no denying that wherever the mindset is adversarial,

267. 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a).
268. See infra notes 269-84 and accompanying text.
269. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2011) ("A lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.").
270. See id. R. 1.3 ("A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client.").
271. See id. R. 1.13.
272. See id. R. 3.1 ("A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an
issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes
a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer for the
defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that could result in
incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the
case be established.") The comment to this rule states: "The filing of an action or defense or
similar action taken for a client is not frivolous merely because the facts have not first been fully
substantiated or because the lawyer expects to develop vital evidence only by discovery." Id. R. 3.1
cmt.
273. See id. R. 3.8.
274. See FUNK ET AL., supra note 257, at 32.
275. Id. (citing JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT IN THE
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 146, 148, 150, 151 (2007)).
276. Id. at 43 (quoting Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, A "Torture" Memo and its Tortuous
Critics, WALL ST. J., Jul. 6, 2004, at A.22 (Eastern edition)).
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this might seem "routine stuff' for lawyers, whether they are private or
government lawyers.
There are now elaborate disciplinary rules regulating "immigration
practitioners." 277 The ethical responsibilities imposed by these rules are
more stringent than the ordinary rules of professional conduct.278 While
the rules against advancing frivolous claims or defenses apply to all
attorneys appearing before an immigration judge,279 some of the more
stringent rules on discipline do not apply to the government's
lawyers,280 who are supposedly subject to separate Department of
Justice disciplinary procedures, which the regulations do reference. 281
The referenced provision, however, says only that any complaints of
professional misconduct go to the Office of Professional Responsibility
(ORP) within the Department of Justice, a department which handles the
complaints through its own bureaucratic process.282 For example, in
2009, the OPR received 1,254 complaints of misconduct from various
sources, took a look at 245 matters, and selected 100 for a full
investigation.283 The full investigations found that twelve government
attorneys were responsible for violations of the rules of professional

277. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.101-108 (2009).
278. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.102 (2009).
279. See 8 C.F.R. § 292.3(a)(1) (2011) (referring to both private lawyers and government
lawyers).
280. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.101(b) (2009):
(b) Persons subject to sanctions. Persons subject to sanctions include any practitioner.
A practitioner is any attorney as defined in §1001.1(f) of this chapter who does not
represent the federal government, or any representative as defined in §1001.1(j) of this
chapter. Attorneys employed by the Department of Justice shall be subject to discipline
pursuant to § 1003.109. Nothing in this regulation shall be construed as authorizing
persons who do not meet the definition of practitioner to represent individuals before the
Board and the Immigration Courts or DHS.
Id. See also 8 C.F.R. § 292.3(b) (2011) (creating two different disciplinary processes-one for
respondents attorneys which is immediate and tangible as the immigration judge would hear the
disciplinary case and one for government attorneys handled through the DOJ's internal process).
281. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.109 ("Complaints regarding the conduct or behavior of Department
attorneys, Immigration Judges, or Board Members shall be directed to the Office of Professional
Responsibility, United States Department of Justice. If disciplinary action is warranted, it shall be
administered pursuant to the Department's attorney discipline procedures."). For a brief discussion
and further citation of this bifurcated disciplinary system, see 1 NAT'L IMMIGRATION PROJECT OF
THE NAT'L LAWYERS GUILD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND DEFENSE § 7:1 (3d ed. 2010).
282. See procedures at U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,

http://www.justice.gov/opr/proc-hdl.htm (last visited Mar.
attorneys are also subject to the United States Attorneys'
titles, including criminal law, which covers immigration.
(1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia
REPORT
ANNUAL
ORP
283. See
http://www.justice.gov/opr/annualreport2009.pdf.

10, 2012). Presumably, the government
Manual, which consist of nine different
UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL
reading room/usam/index.html.
at
available
6
(2009),
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conduct, and only seven of these were found to have done so
willfully. 2 84
It is under this regime of rules and sanctions that the ICE attorneys
represent the government in deportation proceedings. Under section 239
of the INA, they are authorized to issue a Notice to Appear (NTA,285
which is a charging document that outlines, among other thins%2 the
They
or deportability of the noncitizen.
grounds of inadmissibility
289
The INA
then proceed to prove the charges by presenting evidence.
places the burden of proving deportability of an already-admitted
noncitizen on the government. It states in relevant part that the
government "has the burden of establishing by clear and convincing
evidence that .

.

. the alien is deportable. No decision on deportability

shall be valid unless it is based upon reasonable, substantial, and
probative evidence." 290 To carry its burden of proof, the government
may rely on all sorts of evidence, including the respondent's admission
of alienage, which is perhaps the most common source of evidence. 29 1
A respondent's statement of alienage to inquiring law enforcement is
admissible at trial, even if it is obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. 2 92
If the court finds the respondent deportable, he will have the
opportunity to seek affirmative relief.293 The government's attorney, as
the respondent's adversary, is tasked with the duty of making sure that
affirmative relief is not granted by presenting evidence to counter the
respondent's claim.294 This issue is discussed in the next section in
connection with the respondent's role. However, it is important to

284. See id. at 9.
285. The Regulations authorize forty-one different categories of employees of the Department
of Homeland Security to issue NTAs. See 8 C.F.R. § 239.l(a)(l)-(41) (2005).
286. Including the nature of the proceeding, the authority under which it is issued, and the act
that is alleged to be a violation of law. See INA §239(a)(1)(A)-(C) (2006).
287. See INA § 240(a)(2) (2006). The Grounds of inadmissibility are set forth under INA §
212(a)(1)(A) (2010).
288. The grounds of deportability, incorporating grounds of inadmissibility by reference, are
found in INA § 237 (a) (2008).
289. For the details of the procedure, see 8 C.F.R. § 1240.2(b).
290. INA § 240(c)(3)(A) (2006).
291. See generally INA §240(c)(3).
292. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1040-46, 1050 (1984) (holding that the
exclusionary rule does not apply in an immigration deportation proceeding as it is civil-not
criminal-in character). For a recent commentary on the exclusionary rule in immigration, see
generally Jennifer M. Chac6n, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts andthe Adjudication
ofFourth Amendment andFifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563 (2010).
293. Legomsky, supra note 8, at 1641-42.
294. Id.
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emphasize here that, apart from the expectations under the rules of
professional conduct, the government attorneys themselves, because of
training, orientation, and tradition, see their role as more adversarial than
in the criminal process. For example, they are not required to produce
exculpatory evidence, 295 although a due process argument could be
made to that effect in outrageous cases.296
Professor Deborah Anker's study suggests that the government
attorneys "took an oppositional stance" in each of the 193 cases that
For instance, in one case described in this
researchers attended.
study, the government's counsel detected a substantial error of law that
favored his client, the government, and failed to inform the court as he
felt it was not his responsibility to make that correction in the adversarial
process.298 In another case, defense counsel arrived late and the judge
ruled against the non-citizen for that reason.299 When the defense
lawyer asked for a reopening, the court said it would grant it only if the
government agreed. 30 Of course, the government's attorney did not
agree to reopen the case, which remained closed in favor of the
government.301 Recall that this charade happened knowingly in the
presence of researchers. When asked by the researchers for a comment,
the government's attorney said: "My client [the government] wants a
deportation order. We could not have done better." 02 Anker's research
further revealed that the government attorneys'
manner frequently was hostile, sarcastic, or disbelieving ... [they] also
raised repeated and vigorous objections during direct examinations.
Although there are no formal rules of evidence in immigration
proceedings, the trial attorneys made numerous objections to testimony
and evidence including narrative answer, hearsay, lack of foundation,
and leading question. In many cases, this use of objections made it

295. See Deborah E. Anker, DeterminingAsylum Claims in the United States: A Case Study
on the Implementation of Legal Norms in an UnstructuredAdjudicatory Environment, 19 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 433, 489-90 (1992).
296. See, e.g., Diric v. INS, 400 F.2d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1968) (Ely, J., concurring) ("It
distresses me that an alien must depart our country with justified impression that the U.S.
Government, through an over-zealous advocate, has been unnecessarily unkind, if not abusive.").
297. See Anker, supra note 295, at 436, 492.
298. See id. at 491.
299. See id.
300. See id.
301. See id.
302. See id
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difficult for applicants to communicate fear and other feelings they had
303
experienced ... .3
At the most practical level, recent studies have also found that
practitioners believe that ICE attorneys "invariably seek the worst
outcome possible for the immigrant and unnecessarily drag out cases by
litigating every issue, thereby undermining both the legitimacy and
efficiency of Immigration Courts." 3 04
C

The Role of the Respondent

Represented or not, as a party litigant in this tripartite adversarial
process, the respondent has many responsibilities. First, answering the
charges of deportability, a typical NTA reads "you are removable under
INA 237(a)(1)(A) as an alien inadmissible at the time of entry."305 If the
noncitizen admits this charge, knowingly or unknowingly, the judge
would summarily find him deportable as charged.306 Unlike in criminal
proceedings, apart from the duty to provide appropriate translation, no
one has the responsibility to make sure that the respondent understands
the charges, or that she admits or denies them knowingly and
voluntarily. The government's responsibility is rather interesting-it is
only to prevail, and the judge's responsibility is only to declare the
winner.307 It is important to reiterate that, although the respondent has
the right to be represented by counsel, such will not be appointed or
provided to her; she must retain and pay for legal representation, 308
which is why the vast majority of them appear without counsel.309
Second, consistent with the adversarial tradition, the INA allows
the respondent the opportunity to "examine the evidence against [her], to
present evidence on [her own] behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses
presented by the Government ...... "310 Third, if the charge is based on a
lack of legal status and the respondent has a lawful status, she has the
303. Id. at 493, 495.
304. See ABA REPORT ON REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 1-29
(quoting CHICAGO APPLESEED FUND FOR JUSTICE, ASSEMBLY LINE INJUSTICE, BLUEPRINT TO
REFORMING AMERICA'S IMMIGRATION COURTS 16 (2009) [hereinafter Appleseed], available at

http://appleseednetwork.org/Portals/0/Documents/Publications/Chapter/204.pdf.
305. See generally INA § 237(a).
306. See generally 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8.
307. See generally INA § 240(c)(3).
308. See INA § 240(b)(4)(A) ("the alien shall have the privilege of being represented, at no
expense to the Government, by counsel of the alien's choosing who is authorized to practice in such
proceedings.").
309.

See ABA REPORT ON REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 5-8.

310. INA§ 240(b)(4)(B).
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burden of proving the existence of that legal status "by clear and
convincing evidence." 3 11 Although it might at times be as simple as
providing a copy of her documentation of lawful permanent resident
status, colloquially called a 'Green Card,' it often demands some serious
legal maneuvering. Fourth, as indicated in the previous section, if the
government prevails in obtaining the court's ruling on the charge of
deportability, the respondent may be allowed to seek one of the many
forms of affirmative relief, which include asylum,312 adjustment of
status, 3 13 cancellation of removal, 314 and voluntary departure. 3 15 The
respondent bears the burden of proving, not only that he meets the
statutory requirements, but also that he deserves the favorable exercise
of discretion, as all of these forms of relief are discretionary.316 The
most relevant provision to this effect reads:
The applicant must comply with the applicable requirements to submit
information or documentation in support of the applicant's application
for relief or protection as provided by law or regulation or in the
instructions for the application form. In evaluating the testimony of
the applicant or other witness in support of the application, the
immigration judge will determine whether or not the testimony is
credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific facts sufficient to
demonstrate that the applicant has satisfied the applicant's burden of
317
proof.
The government's responsibility remains to be making the contrary
argument with a view to prevailing over the noncitizen. The respondent
has the right to cross-examine the government's witnesses,318 though in
most cases he has no idea how to do this. The next section provides a
detailed discussion of the judge's role in removal proceedings.

311. See INA §240(c)(2)(B).
312. See INA § 208. A related form of relief called withholding of removal may also be sought
as a defense from removal under INA § 241(b)(3). The jurisprudence in this area is rich, but is
beyond the scope of this discussion.
313. See INA § 245.
314. See INA § 240A(a)-(b).
315. See INA § 240B. Other forms of affirmative relief might include Registry under INA §
249 and Relief from Deportation under the CAT, supra note 14.
316. See INA §§ 208, 240A, 240B, 245(a).
317. INA §240(c)(4)(B).
318. See INA § 240(b)(4)(B).
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The Role of the Judge

Writing in a related context, Professor Legomsky notes that judges'
perception of their role, which includes "their own expectations
concerning the functions, duties, and powers that courts ought to
assume-are one of the central factors influencing judicial decisionmaking." 3 19 Under existing rules, the immigration judBe presides over
the dispute between the government and the respondent.
The role of the immigration judge has undergone significant
changes over the years. For much of the history of the U.S. immigration
law, immigration judges were a part of the enforcement process, acting
as senior immigration officers.32 Called "special inquiry officers" prior
to 1996, their duties were not limited to adjudication of cases.322 Due
process concerns over the merger of law enforcement and adjudicative
functions in one official led to the Supreme Court's 1950 decision in
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath,323 which disallowed such merger on
statutory grounds.324 After that decision, however, some uncertainty
lingered because the Court's decision, which predated the enactment of
the INA, rested on the APA and not constitutional due process. 325In
any case, the INA exempted the immigration processes from the
separation of functions requirement of the APA for many practical and
326
political reasons.
The beginning of the adversarial process could be traced to the
enactment of the INA in 1952. According to Professors Aleinikoff,
Martin, and Motomura, "The seeds of this evolution were sown in the
statute itself, which authorized the Attorney General to assign another
immigration officer to present the evidence on behalf of the government

319. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND POLITICS IN
BRITAIN AND AMERICA 235 (1987) (relying on numerous sources). Although he says this in the

judicial decision-making context, the underlying proposition probably holds true in the context of
administrative adjudication.
320. See 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(1) ("The term immigration judge means an attorney whom the
Attorney General appoints as an administrative judge within the Executive Office of Immigration
Review, qualified to conduct specific classes of proceedings including a hearing under section 240
of the [Immigration and Nationality] Act.") (emphasis in original). Although the immigration judge
also adjudicates cases in proceedings other than those under section 240, the focus here is on section
240 proceedings. The other proceedings include expedited proceedings under INA §§ 235, 238.
321. See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN & HIROSHI MOTOMURA,
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 249 (5th ed. 2003).

322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

Id.
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33,49 (1950).
See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supranote 321, at 249.
See id.
Id.
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and to carry cross-examination. This freed the special inquiry officer for
a more passive, judge-like decision making role." 3 27 Regulatory reforms
in 1956 and 1962 created a specialized cadre of government attorneys to
"Today, in
represent the government in deportation proceedings.
practice, trial attorneys appear for the government in all proceedings
before immigration judges." 32 8 The roles and status of the immigration
judges also changed during the same time. Beginning from 1956, a law
degree became a required qualification.329 In 1973, the name changed
from "special inquiry officers" to "immigration judges" and the officials
became required to wear black robes during hearings in the
courtroom.
However, it was not until 1983 that the immigration judges were
formally separated from the enforcement branch, then called the INS, to
be organized under the EOIR within the Department of Justice. That
move was to ensure some independence as their previous position under
the INS subjected them to direct supervision by the district director.331
Although this appeared to be a move toward functional independence,
immigration judges still remained part of the Department of Justice
under the Attorney General, the nation's chief law enforcement
officer.332 The most recent restructuring occurred in 2003 as a result of
the Homeland Security Act. 33 3 It separated the INS, which was the
enforcement branch, and the immigration judges into two departments,
the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice,
respectively. 334 For greater clarity, under the existing statutory and
regulatory structure, immigration judges are within the EOIR under the

327. See id. This evolution in the text refers to the evolution from combining enforcement and
adjudicative functions in one person to separating them. It is used to suggest that that was perhaps
the beginning of the adversarial procedures as the government started to rely on a second official,
leaving the first as a neutral decision maker, which, with the addition of the respondent as a party
litigant, effectively converted the system into the traditional adversarial process.
328. Id. at 249-50.
329. Id. at 250.
330. See id. (citing Sidney B. Rawitz, From Wong Yang Sung to Black Robes, 65 Interpreter
Releases 453 (1988)). See also James P. Vandello, Perspectives of an Immigration Judge, 80
DENV. U. L. REV. 770, 771 (2003) (noting the requirement to wear robes).
331. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 321, at 250-51.
332. Id. at 250. See also Vandello, supra note 330, at 771 (noting that the concern was "judges
being paid by the same agency that prepared and prosecuted cases.").
333. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 6 U.S.C.).
334. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 321, at 251.
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DOJ.335 The functions of the former INS were divided into three
agencies called the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS),336 Customs and Border Protection (CBP),337 and Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE), 338 all within the Department of
Homeland Security.339
Under existing rules, as indicated in the previous section, while ICE
is responsible for representing the government, immigration judges are
supposed to be neutral adjudicators. This neutral role has several
characteristics. The pertinent statutory provision describes the general
role as: "An immigration judge shall conduct proceedings for deciding
the inadmissibility or deportability of an alien." 4o The statute states the
specific functions as: "The immigration judge shall administer oaths,
receive evidence, and interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien
and any witnesses."34 1 Other powers include the issuance of subpoenas
sanctioning of practitioners by civil money penalty for contempt of
A related provision states: "At the conclusion of the
court.342
proceeding the immigration judge shall decide whether an alien is
removable from the United States." 34 3 More particularly, it provides
that "The determination of the immigration judge shall be based only on
the evidence producedat the hearing."344
335. Comprehensive information on the structure is available at U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir (last visited Mar. 10,
2012).
336. Comprehensive information about USCIS is available at U.S. CrIzENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
337. Comprehensive information about the CBP is available at U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION, http://www.cbp.gov (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
338. Comprehensive information about ICE is available at U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
339. Comprehensive information about DHS in general is available at U.S. DEP'T OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
340. INA §240(a)(1).
341. INS § 240(b)(1) (emphasis added).
342. Id.
343. See INA § 240(c)(1)(A).
344. Id. The functions of the immigration judge are elaborated under the relevant regulations.
See 8 C.F.R. 1240.1, which reads in its entirety:
(a) Authority. (1) In any removal proceeding pursuant to section 240 of the Act, the
immigration judge shall have the authority to: (i) Determine removability pursuant to
section 240(a)(1) of the Act; to make decisions, including orders of removal as provided
by section 240(c)(1)(A) of the Act; (ii) To determine applications under sections 208,
212(a)(2)(F), 212(a)(6)(F)(ii), 212(a)(9)(B)(v), 212(d)(l 1), 212(d)(12), 212(g), 212(h),
212(i), 212(k), 237(a)(1)(E)(iii), 237(a)(1)(H), 237(a)(3)(C)(ii), 240A(a) and (b), 240B,
245, and 249 of the Act, section 202 of Pub. L. 105100, section 902 of Pub. L. 105277,
and former section 212(c) of the Act (as it existed prior to April 1, 1997); (iii) To order
withholding of removal pursuant to section 241(b)(3) of the Act and pursuant to the
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As discussed above, the statute allocates the burden of proof
between the respondent and the government, 345 which means that it is
The judge's
their joint responsibility to produce the evidence.
responsibility is limited to keeping the record and ruling on the record as
developed by the parties. In the process of the development of the
record, however, the judge is authorized to subpoena, examine, and
cross-examine witnesses presented by the party litigants as needed. 346
E.

A CloserLook at the Roles of Three Parties:

The above discussion shows that there is no confusion about the
roles of the party-litigants: they are there to win, the government to
deport, and the noncitizen to stay, by all legal means necessary. The role
of the judge, however, is not without confusion. It is characterized by
three distinct functions: First, the immigration judge is supposed to

Convention Against Torture; and (iv) To take any other action consistent with applicable
law and regulations as may be appropriate. (2) In determining cases referred for further
inquiry, immigration judges shall have the powers and authority conferred upon them by
the Act and this chapter. Subject to any specific limitation prescribed by the Act and this
chapter, immigration judges shall also exercise the discretion and authority conferred
upon the Attorney General by the Act as is appropriate and necessary for the disposition
of such cases. An immigration judge may certify his or her decision in any case under
section 240 of the Act to the Board of Immigration Appeals when it involves an
unusually complex or novel question of law or fact. Nothing contained in this part shall
be construed to diminish the authority conferred on immigration judges under sections
101(b)(4) and 103 of the Act. (b) Withdrawal and substitution of immigration judges.
The immigration judge assigned to conduct the hearing shall at any time withdraw if he
or she deems himself or herself disqualified. If an immigration judge becomes
unavailable to complete his or her duties, another immigration judge may be assigned to
complete the case. The new immigration judge shall familiarize himself or herself with
the record in the case and shall state for the record that he or she has done so. (c)
Conduct of hearing. The immigration judge shall receive and consider material and
relevant evidence, rule upon objections, and otherwise regulate the course of the hearing.
(d) Withdrawal of application for admission. An immigration judge may allow only an
arriving alien to withdraw an application for admission.
Once the issue of
inadmissibility has been resolved, permission to withdraw an application for admission
should ordinarily be granted only with the concurrence of the Service. An immigration
judge shall not allow an alien to withdraw an application for admission unless the alien,
in addition to demonstrating that he or she possesses both the intent and the means to
depart immediately from the United States, establishes that factors directly relating to the
issue of inadmissibility indicate that the granting of the withdrawal would be in the
interest of justice. During the pendency of an appeal from the order of removal,
permission to withdraw an application for admission must be obtained from the
immigration judge or the Board.
8 C.F.R. § 1240.1.
345. See, e.g., INA § 240(c)(2), (3)(A).
346. INA § 240(b)(1).
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"conduct proceedings" 347 presumably as a neutral adjudicator. Second
she is supposed to "interrogate, examine and cross-examine" 34
witnesses, supposedly to discover the truth. Third, she is given the
discretion to grant or deny relief when she deems necessary.349
While she must make her decisions based on the record as
developed by the parties and as tested by the judge herself, ultimately
she has no responsibility to add to the record or to independently verify
the truth.35o Whereas her role as a cross-examiner makes her look like a
civil law inquisitorial judge, her mandate's restriction to the record
produced by the parties makes her look like a traditional common law
oriented adversarial judge. But then, she also has this power to grant or
deny relief in the exercise of discretion, which actually makes her look
more like an executive official than a judicial one. In fact, her boss is
the nation's chief law enforcement officer, who delegates this discretion
to her.35 1 That means he could reward her if he likes her or fire her if he
does not.352 She is supposed to be independent, but she has to be
respectful of her law enforcement colleagues, who appear before her as
prosecutors even though they are in a different department of the same
agency. When an indigent respondent appears before her who knows
nothing about the process, she often can't help him. She presides over
an average of 4.3 deportation cases a day.
She shares her only
assistant with four other judges. 354 The majority of the respondents who
appear before her do not speak her language.35 Her computer is old and
her voice recorder malfunctioning, yet she is expected to render detailed,
intelligible, and thoughtful oral decisions. Her stress level is often

347. See INA §240(a)(1).
348. See INA §240(b)(1).
349. See, e.g., INA § 208 (asylum); § 240A(a)-(b) (cancellation of removal).
350. Id.
351. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2009); see also Authorities Delegated to the Director of the
Executive Office for Immigration Review, and the Chief Immigration Judge, 72 Fed. Reg. 53, 673
(Sept. 20, 2007) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 1003.).
352. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L.
REv. 369, 374-75, 389 (2006).
353. See Legomsky, supranote 8, at 1652 (citing Appleseed, supra note 304, at 10).
354. Id.
355. About 78 percent of respondents have a language other than English as their first or
primary language. Id. at 1653.
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higher than an emergency room physician.356 She wears so many hats.
She has so many identities. Is she "schizophrenic?" 357
The ordinary respondent who appears before this judge faces the
worst of both the adversarial and inquisitorial systems because: (1) He
is subjected to cross examination and other forms of testing, not only by
the opposing counsel, but also by the judge, who may appear to him to
be "on his side." 358 (2) If he cannot present his own evidence and he
otherwise fails to carry his burden of proof, he gets no help from the
judge, except one or two continuations so that he can find counsel who
could help him. In other words, unlike the inquisitorial judge who could
rely on judicially-discovered evidence, the immigration judge has to rely
exclusively on evidence presented by the parties. Unlike the common
law judge who should maintain "cold neutrality," 35 9 the immigration
judge is required to cross-examine and test the credibility of the
Unlike the inquisitorial judge, she is not authorized to
respondent.
help the respondent find and/or produce evidence that could help his
356. This seems to be true. See id. at 1655-56 (citing a web-based survey summarized in Stuart
L. Lustig et al., Inside the Judges' Chambers: Narrative from the National Association of
ImmigrationJudges Stress and Burnout Survey, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 57, 59-60 (2008)).
357. This term is borrowed from the following paragraph by Jeffrey S. Wolfe and Lisa B.
Proszek's article on the role of Administrative Law Judges in the social security context, which has
some similarities, as will be discussed in Part VI infra. The passage reads:
The problem, of course, is that the Commissioner is unrepresented by counsel in the
administrative hearing. The task of eliciting such evidence befalls the Administrative
Law Judge, who must cull from the evidentiary record pertinent facts upon which to base
his or her inquiry of the vocational expert, who must then opine regarding the existence
of other work within the national or regional economies. The inquiry is undertaken by
the judge, subject to cross-examination by the claimant's lawyer. The courts have
described this process as a sort of judicial schizophrenia, i.e., Social Security
Administration Administrative Law Judge wears the "dual hats" of investigator and
adjudicator.
Jeffrey S. Wolfe & Lisa B. Proszek, Interaction Dynamics in Federal Administrative Decision
Making: The Role of the InquisitorialJudge and the Adversarial Lawyer, 33 TULSA L.J. 293, 298
(1997) (emphasis in original) (citing Pastrana v. Chater, 917 F. Supp. 103, 106-07 (D.P.R. 1996)).
The role that is considered schizophrenic in the social security context is the coupling of
investigative and decision making roles, which was historically the case in immigration as described
above. However, the existing system is more schizophrenic than the previous system because of the
lack of clarity of the role, which is characterized by one sided investigation and decision-making
without adversarial neutrality. It is a combination of irreconcilable aspects of two systems.
358. See, e.g., Anker, supra note 295, at 489 ("Instead of an independent adjudicator and an
opposing counsel, the perception arose in many cases that applicants faced two, instead of one,
opposing counsels.").
359. See Wolfe & Proszek, supra note 357, at 300-01 (quoting United States v. Orbiz, 366 F.
Supp. 628, 629 (D.P.R. 1973) ("A defendant is entitled to the cold neutrality of an impartial judge
and the law intends that no judge shall preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested,
impartial and independent.")).
360. Id. at 303.
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case.361 This arrangement is a lose-lose arrangement, not only for the
respondent, but also for the government and the judge. It is a liability
for the government's counsel when the respondent is unrepresented
because, apart from the match being uninteresting and hopelessly onesided, the judge cannot test the strength and propriety of the
government's case against the respondent. It is a liability for the judge
because the information she gets is one-sided and she can never be
certain about its accuracy or completeness. As she cannot collect her
own evidence, she has to make a decision based on one-sided
information. At a more practical level, even when the respondent is
represented and the duel is matched, what the judge gets is selected bits
of evidence, twisted facts, and coached fact and expert witnesses. To the
extent this kind of adversarial process is believed to be instrumental to
arriving at an accurate result, the most fundamental aspect of it is
missing in the deportation context-the judge is not supposed to
maintain "cold neutrality."362 Considered holistically, it is clear that the
existing system picks and chooses the worst aspects of the adversarial
and inquisitorial systems. The end result, not surprisingly, is a system
that does not work well for anyone, least of all the respondent, who is
the least-equipped of the three to navigate the process. There is no
disagreement as to this conclusion, although there is diversity of opinion
concerning the diagnosis. The next section looks at current diagnostic
opinions and proposals for reform as a prelude to the proposals outlined
in the section that follows.
IV. CURRENT DIAGNOSIS AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

Increased appreciation of the failings of the system of immigration
adjudication has in recent times created an upsurge of diagnostic
and prominent
studies363 and reform proposals by organizations,

361. Id. at 303-04.
362. See INA § 240 (b)(1). For example, take the following passage from Professor's Anker's
study: "In general, the judges' activism was not directed at assisting the applicant in developing the
substance of her claim ... the judges' basic conception of the hearing and their role was to 'test'not to help establish-the applicant's credibility." See Anker, supra note 295, at 497-98. But see
Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Jacinto v. INS, 208 F.3d 725, 733-34
(9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the U should "scrupulously and conscientiously probe into inquire of,
and explore for all the relevant facts[']" but then adding "We emphasize that our holding today will
not transform Us into attorneys for aliens appearing pro se in deportation proceedings.)
The
confusion is clearly enduing.
363.

The most notable ones are the ABA REPORT ON REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM,

supranote 7; Appleseed, supra note 304; and Ramji-Nogales et al., supranote 25.
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scholars.365 From this, two sets of coherent narratives have emergedone set relating to the diagnosis and another relating to reform. Each set
is briefly described below.
A.

Diagnosis

All studies and scholarly commentary agree that the system suffers
from inefficiency, inaccuracy, and unacceptable levels of lack of
fairness.366 To avoid unnecessary repetition, the ABA study, which is
the most recent and most comprehensive of all studies, may be used as a
guide to highlighting the perceived causes of the problem. This study
lists several substantive and procedural factors that burden the system
unnecessarily. The substantive factors include the statutory bars to
reentry367 and the breadth of the definitions of aggravated felony and
crimes of moral turpitude.368 At the procedural level, shortcomings
include: large caseloads; inadequate staffing and facilities; inappropriate
recruitment and training; bias; and lack of clarity of ethical standards
and problems of decisional independence.369 On the prosecution side,
shortcomings include inefficient use of prosecutorial discretion,
inconsistent positions on issues within the department, and unnecessary
Lack of representation of respondents in these
detentions.
proceedings is also identified as a major problem. 37 1
B.

Reform Proposals

The problem that attracted the most attention is the lack of
decisional independence, which is perceived to be inherent in the

364. Most notably, ABA REPORT ON REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 7, at

Part 6.
365. Most notably, Legomsky, Restructuring ImmigrationAdjudication, supra note 8.
366. See id. at 1651; see also Chac6n, supra note 292, at 1628-30; ABA REPORT ON
REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 6-4; Appleseed, supra note 304, at 6 (all
discussing these problems in detail).
367. See ABA REPORT ON REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 1-65.

368. Id. at 1-65 to -66.
369. See id. at 2-16 to -27; see also Jill Family, Beyond DecisionalIndependence: Uncovering
Contributors to the Immigration Adjudication Crisis, 59 U. KAN. L. REv. 541, 541-42 (2011)
(appreciating the problem of decisional independence but identifying related problems and
advocating a holistic approach to solving the crisis).
370. See ABA REPORT ON REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 1-25 to -

59.
371. See id. at 5-1 to -10. Professor Legomsky classifies the shortcoming into four categories:
severe underfunding, reckless procedural shortcuts, inappropriate politicization of the process, and
some unsuitable adjudicators. See Legomsky, supranote 8, at 1639.
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structure. As such, most reform proposals focus on that issue. 372 The
pioneer of this reform movement is Professor Legomsky. In his 2006
Cornell article, he argued convincingly that law enforcement supervision
diminishes the independence of immigration adjudicators.37 3 He took
that discussion a step further in his 2010 Duke article and provided a
more complete picture of the reform that he envisions. 374 A closer look
at his proposal is very instructive.
Professor Legomsky's proposed reform would convert immigration
judges into ordinary administrative law judges with all the
accompanying benefits and protections; this would take them out of the
DOJ and put them under a new independent executive department.3 75
His proposal then merges the existing two levels of appellate review,
i.e., the BIA and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals into a one-level
specialized Article III court for immigration review, staffed with
experienced district and circuit court judges on a two-year rotation
assignment.376 He argues rather convincingly that this would be
constitutional 377 and provides the policy and cost benefits of this
system.378 At the policy level, it maintains the specialization that is
required of the administrative system while preserving a generalist
review through the Article III court. 379 He calls this court generalist
The
because of its being staffed by rotating generalist judges.
benefits of this court system seem clear: it merges two levels of review
into one, simultaneously lowering judicial costs and providing due
process by a neutral judiciary not subject to the supervision of law
372. Several studies and writings proposed an article I court to replace the existing system of
immigration adjudication. See ABA REPORT ON REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra
note 7, at Part 6 (analyzing various options); see also Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 25, at 386
(endorsing the Article I option). For an older proposal, see Peter J. Levinson, A Specialized Court
for Immigration Hearings and Appeals, 56 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 644, 651-54 (1981). But see
generally Lawrence Baum, JudicialSpecialization and the Adjudication of Immigration Cases, 59
DUKE L.J. 1501 (2010) (expressing uncertainty about the outcome of a specialized court system).
373. See Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, supra note 352, at 376-77.
Ashcroft's restructuring of the BIA seems to have provoked a significant part of the increased
interest on the issue of decisional independence. For Professor Legomsky's earlier reaction, see
LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 7, at 744-51. One interesting note is the following: "When
the axe finally fell, it fell almost entirely on those Board members whose decisions had most
frequently favored the noncitizens; credentials and seniority clearly played little, if any, role." Id. at
750. The earlier edition of this book also contained the same note.
374. See Legomsky, supranote 8, at 1636.
375. Id. at 1640.
376. See id at 1686-88.
377. See id.
378. See id. at 1688-1710.
379. See id. at 1694-96.
380. See id. at. 1692.
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enforcement officials of the executive branch.381 Professor Legomsky
would preserve the specialization at the trial level because this
specialization is useful and important. He notes that one of the benefits
of specialization is the ability of the ALJ to help the unrepresented
respondent.382 This aspect of the proposal is quite interesting.
This knowledge [legal knowledge and expertise] lessens their
dependency on counsel and staff for basic information and mitigates
the risk that a party will win or lose because of an imbalance in the
skills or efforts of the opposing attorneys. When parties appear pro se,
the expertise of the adjudicator can be at least a partial substitute for
counsel.3 83
He does not, however, define the exact responsibilities of the ALJ,
nor does he address the issue of the conduct of proceedings before the
ALJs. It could be assumed that he would probably maintain the existing
adjudicatory environment while freeing the judges from political control.
While endorsing Professor Legomsky's macro-level restructuring
proposal for the reasons that he presents so well, the following section
focuses on the micro-level issues, the actual conduct of the proceedings
before the ALJ, and that section recommends that ALJs be assigned an
inquisitorial role, minimizing the need for representation, saving a
significant amount of resources, and improving the fairness of the
system. The following proposed micro-level changes are useful in
addressing some of the existing problems, even if the existing macrolevel structure remains unchanged.
V. THE INQUISITORIAL ADVANTAGE
As Professor Taylor notes, "structural reform by itself will not
necessarily improve the judicial demeanor of the intemperate, or make
the slip-shod judge more careful." 384 She attributes the problem in part
to "too many people who should not be in a position of judging others
especially those with no power serving as immigration judges." 383

381. See id at 1689-1710. Interestingly, he notes that BIA review is actually more expensive
than court of appeals review. See id at 1698.
382. Id. at 1692-93.
383. Id.
384. See Margaret H. Taylor, Refugee Roulette in an Administrative Law Context: The DeYd
Vu ofDecisional Disparitiesin Agency Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REv. 475, 500 (2007).
385. Id. (quoting Charles H. Koch, Jr., AdministrativePresidingOfficials Today, 46 ADMIN. L.
REV. 271, 275 (1994)).
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Other scholars offer other explanations,386 but surprisingly, no close
attention has been given to the benefits, drawbacks, and effects of the
This section brings the
adversarial nature of the proceedings.
insinuations of the discussions in the previous sections to bear by
focusing on the comparative advantages of the inquisitorial system.
At the risk of over-simplification, the basic considerations could be
reduced into four basic categories: (1) cost and efficiency, (2) accuracy,
The advantages an
(3) fairness, and (4) political acceptability.
inquisitorial system would bring to the trial level are discussed under
these four categories.
A.

Cost andEfficiency

The noncitizen's adversaries in deportation proceedings, the
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) of the Department of
Homeland Security and the Office of Immigration Litigation (OIL) of
the Department of Justice, jointly employee 951 attorneys. 387 712 of
those attorneys are ICE attorneys, and the remaining 239 are OIL
attorneys.388 Most notably, the total number of attorneys who represent
the government is more than quadruple the number of immigration
judges. All of these attorneys are tasked with the responsibility of
making sure that the immigrants in deportation proceedings are
deported. As such, they almost always take a position inconsistent with
that of the immigrant as the immigrant's adversary. 3 89 In this
adversarial system, they can, and are expected to, make all non-frivolous
arguments that might help their client, the government, win. To use
Judge Marvin Frankel's words once again, they are gladiators who use
their lethal weapons in the courtroom not to crusade after the truth, but
to win. 3 90 Although Judge Frankel said this in the civil litigation
context, it is just as true, if not more so, in the context of deportation
proceedings. As he declares, "if this is banal, it is also overlooked too
much. . . " 391
386.

See, e.g., ABA REPORT ON REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 2-25

to -26; see also sources cited in Section II.b supra.
387. See Legomsky, supra note 8, at 1701, relying on data he collected through phone
interviews and e-mail messages from DHS and DOJ contacts. Of the total number, 712 are ICE
attorneys. Id.
388. Id. ICE attorneys earn anywhere from $49,544 to $127,604 per year. OIL attorneys earn
an average of $123,000 per year. Id.
389. Studies support this conclusion. See, e.g., ABA REPORT ON REFORMING THE
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 1-28 to -29.

390. Frankel, supra note 38, at 1039.
391. Id.
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Imagine the amount of taxpayers' money we would save and the
kind of order and civility we would bring to the courtroom if we did not
have 951 attorneys representing the same client. It might sound
simplistic, but consider for a moment why the United States government
would ever need this many skillful attorneys to deport immigrants, most
of whom are unrepresented. If this organization under the current
system were to be defended, if there were a simple reason why this setup
is the ideal one, how would that defense be presented? What might that
simple reason be? One thing is certain, the answer could not include
cost-saving and efficiency, two traits no one seriously associates with
As to cost and efficiency, the inquisitorial
the adversarial system.
model is clearly preferable because it would ask the 951 attorneys to
leave the courtroom, or, if they remain in the courtroom, each would be
the sole lawyer in the courtroom adjudicating cases, and not fighting
tooth and nail against an unarmed adversary.
Of course, the non-frivolous argument for the preservation of the
adversarial system relates to the next three points: accuracy, fairness,
and political acceptability of the adjudicatory system. The merits of
these claims in the deportation context are considered in turn below.
B.

Accuracy

If we must spend money on lawyers to ensure the accuracy of the
outcome of immigration litigation, imagine what accuracy might result if
we were to add 712 more judges. This would require converting all of
the 712 ICE attorney positions into immigration judge positions, and
preserving the 239 OIL attorney positions for various immigrationrelated prosecutorial type work that even an inquisitorial system might
require. The immediately apparent effect of this conversion would be
that the existing 4.3 caseload per day per immigration judge would go
down to about 1 a day. Give any immigration judge one case per day,

392. For example, in an older piece, Professor David Martin suggested that affirmative asylum
adjudication by asylum officers in a non-adversarial setting costs less than half of the adjudication
of an asylum claim by an immigration judge in an adversarial setting. See David A. Martin, Making
Asylum Policy: The 1994 Reforms, 70 WASH. L. REv. 725, 746 (1995) (back then, while
affirmative asylum cost $600, defensive asylum before an immigration judge cost $1,300). For a
comprehensive review of the asylum system that existed before the reform that Professor Martin
discusses in the above cited article, and his proposal, which led to the current non-adversarial model
of the existing affirmative asylum system, see generally David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum
Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast ofBohemia, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1247 (1990).
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remove the attempts by the attorneys to "spray pepper in her eyes' 3 93
and measure the accuracy of the outcome. Even to equalize the existing

caseload of immigration judges with that of the Social Security
Administrative Law Judges, we would need 97 more immigration
judges. 394 Note, however, that the SSA proceedings are not adversarial,
on the same side, doing the
which is why they have 1,006 judges
same thing, and not confusing one another. If we were to add 941
lawyers to the existing pool of 214 immigration jud~es, we would have
1,155 judges, significantly more than the SSA ALJs.
To be sure, as discussed in Section II.c above, in relation to the
debate between Langbein and Gross, there are three fundamental
arguments against the inquisitorial system which relate to accuracy. The
first of these perceived disadvantages is the possibility of a premature
judgment by an inquisitorial judge who is also serving as an investigator.
The response to this is that the claimant is a part of the investigation
from start to finish and thus will be able to direct the investigating judge
to evidence that favors him. In the deportation context, where the
majority of the immigrants are not represented, the alternative is
allowing the judge to make a decision based on one-sided evidence. A
premature decision based on one's own investigation is probably better
than a decision based on incomplete evidence carefully selected and
presented by one persuasive party. As Langbein suggests, the benefits
of deliberately keeping a judge ignorant are not very impressive. 39 7 In
any case, the effects of it depend on judicial temperament and
experience that could perhaps be remedied through careful recruitment
and proper training.3 9 8 A related, perceived advantage of the adversarial
system is the educational role that counsels may play in terms of

393. For this suggestion in the context of civil trial, see FRANK, supra note 100, at 85 ("Our
present trial method is thus the equivalent of throwing pepper in the eye of a surgeon when he is
performing an operation.").
394. According to the ABA, the caseload of each one of the approximately 214 immigration
judge in FY 2008 was 1500 matters, including all motions and bond hearings, about 1000 requiring
a decision. By comparison, the caseload for each one of the 1006 SSA ALJs in 2007 was an
average of 544 cases. According to the study, to match that number, we would need 97 more
immigration judges. See ABA REPORT ON REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 7, at
2-37.
395. See id. at 2-37.
396. Converting ICE trial attorneys into ALs for immigration could raise issues of
prosecutorial bias; however, the bias is often functional, not inherent. A change in role ordinarily
changes the bias. To the extent that bias is a concern, however, some balance might be sought in
the hiring, training, and retention process.
397. See Langbein, supra note 31, at 830.
398. See id. at 848-51.
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bringing cases and authority to the attention of the court. Apart from
that being counterbalanced by the inevitable deliberate selectiveness
which could lead to misinformation, whatever benefit there is, it is even
less in the immigration context as immigration judges are specialists in
the area and that most cases involve factual rather than legal disputes.
The second, and perhaps more important, argument relates to
individual autonomy. As Langbein notes, the celebration of the
adversarial system comes from the criminal justice system. This system
has some very basic principles, such as the presumption of innocence,
the privilege against self-incrimination, and requiring proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.399 The adversarial system in the criminal
context protects the accused person's right to gather his own evidence
and present it in a way he wishes. 400 If that responsibility were given
over to a judicial officer, the defendant would lose his autonomy. This
loss of autonomy is not necessarily linked to accuracy, but the argument
is that the truth emerges in the courtroom through selective presentation
of the evidence.40 1 Whatever merits this may have in the context of the
criminal justice system-which is doubtful as the criminal justice system
also has its own problems-it does not necessarily hold true in the
immigration context. First, there is no presumption of "innocence" as
such in the immigration context and the standards of proof are different.
In the removal process, the government has the burden of proving
What would the
alienage by clear and convincing evidence.402
noncitizen lose if a judicial officer, who does not have to win a case,
investigates the claim of alienage? Particularly, if the noncitizen is
without counsel, he would have everything to gain if the only official is
a person who is interested in finding out the truth, not deporting him as a
matter of duty.
Once alienage is established, the noncitizen bears the burden of
proving that he is in the country lawfully.403 There are a limited number
of documents in the government's possession that could help him prove
404
The noncitizen loses absolutely nothing if the judge were to
that.
investigate the government's records to find out what status the
noncitizen has. If he is found to have a status of lawful presence, the
399. Id. at 842 & n.68 (citing Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655 (1976) (noting that
"the preservation of an adversary system of criminal justice" is "the fundamental purpose of the
Fifth Amendment.")).
400. See id at 842.
401. See id. at 842-43.
402. INA § 240 (c)(3)(A).
403. Id. §240 (c)(2)(B).
404. Id.
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government bears the burden of proving that he is deportable-again by
This evidence is almost always found
clear and convincing evidence.
in the possession of government bodies, whether state or federal. The
issue of deportability often revolves around whether certain facts, such
as convictions, fit the statutory grounds of deportation. In a situation
where both the government and the noncitizen are represented,
interesting arguments could be heard. Even then, though, there is no
guarantee that the judge gets candid presentation. She has to make her
judgment based on unabashedly partisan presentation. If she were to be
the investigator with sufficient resources, she could make her own
decisions without confusion.
If the noncitizen is unrepresented, which is more likely than not the
case, it is a totally different story. The judge then makes her decision
based on a completely one-sided presentation. If the noncitizen is found
deportable, the onus shifts to him to prove his eligibility for a form of
affirmative relief. In this context, the judge has full discretion to grant it
or not. Allowing her to investigate the facts and the law would only
facilitate her decision-making. If the noncitizen is unrepresented,
however, there is no meaningful presentation of evidence. The judge
can only rely on the government's presentation, which is always
negative toward the noncitizen, as it is the function of the adversarial
system. Obviously, in that situation, the noncitizen would be well
served if the judge were empowered to do the investigation of the
evidence. Recall the response by the immigration judge at the beginning
of this article, which laconically sums up the adversarial system in the
situation presented by the student. An inquisitorial judge would make
sure that the non-citizen's forms are completed properly, would
investigate the facts on her own and would rule as she deems
appropriate. If she passively waits for submissions before declaring a
winner, her decisions are necessarily inaccurate every time there is an
imbalance in representation. This is more likely than not in most
immigration cases.
The third issue is the potential for bureaucratic abuse when the duty
of investigation is merged with that of decision-making. It is an old
dilemma in the administrative law arena, which has been tolerated by the
Supreme Court.406 It is undeniable that the career judiciary could be a
large bureaucracy prone to misuse of power, but in the context of
405. Id.
406. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971) ("Neither are we persuaded by the
advocate-judge-multiple-hat suggestion . . . [The Administrative Law Judge] . . . does not act as

counsel. He acts as an examiner charged with developing facts.").
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deportation, the alternative is many times worse. It typically involves on
one side a governmental interest represented by vigorous counsel
seeking to make sure that the non-citizen is deported at all costs, an
unrepresented non-citizen who does not understand the chaotic swirling
of events around him, and a judge who needs to make a decision based
on an intentionally incomplete record developed through the parties'
adversarial exchange. How accurate could that be? How often does that
system get the decision right?
C

Fairness

The complexity of the immigration law does not need repeating.
We also know that the overwhelming majority of non-citizens in
deportation proceedings are not represented by counsel. The best they
could expect to get in the way of assistance is forms, checklists, and
templates, which some courts reject for not meeting formal
requirements.407
The government, on the other hand, is always
represented by attorneys who have the advantage of being repeat players
and who have access to government data that the noncitizen does not
have. If the noncitizen wants to see the records, he would have to file a
FOIA request, which takes an inordinate amount of time. When the
government's attorney appears in the courtroom, it is often in a suit and
tie or some other formal attire. When the noncitizen appears, it is often
in a neon orange jumpsuit. Instead of a tie, some wear shackles. 40 8
While the court makes no mention of the low dress code of the
noncitizen, his decorum triggers a prejudgment response in the judge's
mind, instantly making the noncitizen fight up an even steeper hill.
The fairness argument relates to the fact that the adversarial system
provides both parties the opportunity to be heard. To use Langbein's
words, it presumes Waffenungleichheit, or the inequality of weapons.409
If the weapons are not matched, there is no denying that there is no fair
duel. So, in the majority of the cases in deportation proceedings where
the government is well-represented and the noncitizen unrepresented, it
is fair to assume that the adversarial system yields unfair results as a
matter of common sense. When the noncitizen is represented, it might
seem like the system could be fair. But even then, it is not. Going back
to Professor Anker's study, because of the judge's responsibility under

407. See, e.g., Appleseed, supra note 304, at 30-31.
408. 1 have had clients who appeared before immigration judges in shackles because of alleged
disciplinary violations in the detention facility.
409. See Langbein, supranote 31, at 843.
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the statute to test the credibility of the respondent, but not to help him, it
almost always appears that the respondent faces two well-trained
government attorneys against him. The judge examines and crossexamines witnesses as a matter of statutory obligation. Often, the only
witness in these proceedings is the noncitizen. Refusing to testify is not
an option because that usually means no case at all for the immigrant.
The judge's position is awkward: it is actively investigative when
testing the credibility of the respondent if he presents evidence, whether
through an attorney or otherwise, but passively neutral if no evidence is
presented by the respondent. So, Anker's conclusion that the respondent
faces two government attorneys under the existing system seems
accurate.4 10
However, under the investigative model, the judge would treat both
parties equally and attempt to find both inculpatory as well as
exculpatory evidence and would then decide the case based on her own
investigation through the help of the parties. In this instance, the system
would be fair for both parties, as there would not be a representational
advantage. Instead of the appearance of facing two governmental
attorneys, the noncitizen would face only one, who would be tasked with
the duty of finding the truth and applying the law impartially. It is
reasonable to expect that most would do so fairly and appropriately. 4 11
For exactly this reason, despite many complaints, it appears that the
affirmative asylum system is fairer than the adversarial immigration
court system. 4 2
410. See, e.g., Anker, supra note 295, at 489 ("Instead of an independent adjudicator and an
opposing counsel, the perception arose in many cases that applicants faced two, instead of one,
opposing counsels.").
411. As Professor Legomsky noted in an e-mail to this author, in such a system, the decisional
independence of the Judges would be even more important than in the existing system. Indeed, that
is an issue that needs to be properly addressed at the macro level.
412. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 384, at 500 (citing Gregg A. Beyer, Affirmative Asylum
Adjudication in the UnitedStates, 6 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 253 (1992)); Gregg A. Beyer, Establishing
the United States Asylum Officer Corps: A FirstReport, 4 I NT'L J. REFUGEE L. 455 (1992); Gregg
A. Beyer, Reforming Affirmative Asylum Processing in the United States: Challenges and
Opportunities. 9 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 9, 43-78 (1994); David A. Martin, Making Asylum Policy:
The 1994 Reforms, 70 WASH. L. REV. 725 (1995); see also Ming H. Chen, Explaining Disparities
in Asylum Claims, 12 GEO. PUB. POL'Y REV. 29 (2007) (suggesting, based on social science data,
that the non-adversarial affirmative asylum system has significant benefits). In her own words:
It is important to highlight social scientific concepts in the framing of the problem and
the formulation of explanatory hypotheses so that social science can also inform policy
reforms. Notably, this study of asylum adjudication reveals that social science intuitions
and explanations differ from the shared wisdom of lawyers. Immigration attomeys
implicitly assume that their clients will benefit from increased formalism and legalism.
As a result, they struggle mightily to obtain increased substantive rights and enhanced
procedural protections for asylum applicants. However, social science challenges that
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PoliticalAcceptability

Presumably a fair, efficient, and less costly system would have
better political acceptability. The inquisitorial system is cheaper, as it
gets rid of the needless adversity and the resulting complexity. If 712
ICE attorneys are taken outside of the courtroom, not only would that
free up a lot of space and time, but they could also be used for a more
productive and useful activity, such as serving as immigration judges.
This might seem a strange proposal, given that merging investigative
and decision-making authorities into one person is considered harmful to
the vulnerable party. 4 13 That might be true if the weapons in the duel
are matched. But the reality in deportation proceedings is that the
adversarial system costs the government more money, causes more
suffering to the noncitizen, and brings serious confusion to the judge.
The end result is a needlessly complicated, less forgiving, and more
expensive adjudicatory system. Such a system is less politically
acceptable than the alternative, at which nobody seems to be currently
looking-a system whereby the judge investigates the facts and decides
the case-a system where errors could be corrected through appeals,
which could take many different forms, including Professor Legomsky's
Article III Court proposal.
VI. CONCLUSION
When Stefan Riesenfeld, who later became a distinguished
international scholar, arrived in America in January 1935, the renowned
legal realist Karl Llewellyn reportedly told him: if you want to give
your idea a "kiss of death," say that it has originated in a foreign
country.414 But, to quote a foreign jurist in this domestic proposal,
"Why don't [we] take advantage of what has been done by the civil law,
that governs at least twice as many people as the common law, is two
thousand years older, and embodies a much greater amount of human

assumption. Under certain circumstances, the more informal and less adversarial climate
of asylum interviews benefits asylum applicants, whereas the adversarial character of
Immigration Court acts to their detriment.
Id. at 44-45.
413. See generally Milton M. Carrow, A Tortuous Road to Bureaucratic Fairness: Righting
the Social Security Disability Claims Process, 46 ADMIN. L. REv. 297 (1994) (arguing that the
merging of these two functions in one person in the context of the social security system is a bad
idea. He certainly has not considered the problems with that system which this article did in some
detail).
414. Stiefel & Maxeiner, supra note 31, at 162 (citing Riesenfeld, Statement at the Association
of American Law Schools Annual Meeting (1987)).
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experience?"415 In fact, introducing the inquisitorial model is not such a
revolutionary idea. The affirmative asylum system is one example, and
many administrative agencies already use the system with varying
degrees of success.416
This article does not recommend any specific inquisitorial model,
but it looks at the problem presented by the adversarial system from
inside the courtroom and tries to call attention to a neglected factor in
the debate. The debate is decidedly at the macro level, focusing mainly
on administrative and judicial structure and decisional independence.
The question is almost never asked how well the adversarial system at
the micro level is serving immigration adjudication. This article raises
that question and finds that the answer is not promising. What sustains
the adversarial system is the unwarranted association between civil
liberties and the adversarial system,4 17 and the unsupported conclusion
that it leads to a more accurate, politically acceptable, and fair result.
Whatever its merits in the criminal justice system, it does not hold true
in the immigration system.
This article has attempted to show that the adversarial system in the
deportation context does not work well for anyone-not for the
prosecutor, not for the judge, and most of all not for the respondent. It is
a political and cultural imaginary with no real benefits, but with
significant drawbacks. Put simply, it is a due process issue. As the
Supreme Court has noted, "considerations of what procedures due
process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin
with a determination of the precise nature of the government function
involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by
governmental action."418 What works in one context may not work in
another. In a situation where only one party is represented, a claim of
adversarial fairness or 'cold neutrality' of the adjudicator is a mockery
of justice. The call for the provision of representation to indigent
respondents in deportation proceedings has so far yielded no result, and
a favorable result is unlikely any time soon. If one of the parties in an
adversarial proceeding is unrepresented, elementary notions of fairness
415. Id. at 147 n.1. This statement is attributed to French Jurist Pierre LePaulle.
416. The Social Security Administration is another example. For a brief comparison between
the asylum adjudication process and the social security adjudication process, see Taylor, supra note
384, at 485-95. The standard citation on the fundamentals of the Social Security Adjudication cited
in id. is JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY
CLAIMS (1983).

417. Kessler, supranote 31, at 1273.
418. Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); see
also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,261-63 (1970).
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require that the other be not represented as well. That leaves two people
in the courtroom: the respondent and the judge. Perhaps, in such
situation, the judge should investigate the case and make a decision on
her own. That is much better than the alternative, which has been
tolerated for far too long. Needless to say, we know that such an
inquisitorial model in the administrative arena is perfectly
constitutional.419 Until we are able to match the weapons in the duel,
maybe we ought to think about settling the dispute differently.

419. See, e.g., Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 403 (1971).
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